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NOTE
THERE IS NO "RATIONAL BASIS" FOR KEEPING
IT A "SECRET" ANYMORE: WHY THE FTDA'S
"ACTUAL HARM" REQUIREMENT SHOULD NOT
BE INTERPRETED THE SAME WAY FOR
DILUTION CAUSED BY BLURRING AS IT IS FOR
DILUTION CAUSED BY TARNISHING
I.

INTRODUCTION

Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 ("FTDA"), 1
Congress created a federal cause of action for trademark dilution.2 The
term dilution encompasses two distinct recognizable harmsspecifically, dilution by blurring and dilution by tarnishing.3 When a
famous mark is blurred, its distinctive character is diminished in the
minds of consumers, thereby impairing its effectiveness in
distinguishing the goods bearing the famous mark from the goods of
others. Tarnishing involves the disparagement of the famous mark by
associating it with something distasteful.' Conceptually, these forms of
dilution are different, but both undermine the selling of a mark.6 The
legislative history of the FTDA confirms that Congress intended to enact

1. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c), 1127 (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
2. See 15 U.S.C. § I 125(c)(1), (stating that:
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity and
upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against another person's
commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark
has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark, and to
obtain such other relief as is provided in this subsection.).
3. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 8 (1995) (The statutory definition of dilution is "designed
to encompass all forms of dilution recognized by the courts, including dilution by blurring, by
tamishment and disparagement, and by diminishment."), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1035; see also discussion infra Part IV.A-B.
4.

See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 189-90 (7th ed. 1999).

5. See id. at 190.
6.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. c (1995).
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a statute that provided a remedy for both forms of dilution.7 The FTDA
imposes on the owner of a famous trademark the burden of proving that
the junior user's mark "causes dilution" of the famous mark.8 The
question remained how the phrase "causes dilution" should be
interpreted.
Almost all United States Courts of Appeals have addressed this
issue and have adopted one of two standards of harm. 9 Some circuits
required the owner of the famous mark to demonstrate objective proof of
"actual harm" to the economic value of its mark, while others have
granted relief on a showing of a mere "likelihood-of-harm."' This
disagreement, historically characterized as a "circuit split," is the kind
which the Supreme Court would be called upon to resolve. Indeed, the
Supreme Court performed its familiar function when, on March 4, 2003,
it decided Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue,Inc., 1 holding that the "causes
dilution" element should be interpreted as to require a showing of
"actual harm."' 2 Yet, the Court did not go as far as some circuit courts
did by expressly rejecting any requirement that the owner of a famous
mark prove dilution by demonstrating loss of actual sales or profits.13
At best the Court's opinion can be viewed as providing two guide
posts: one being that a mere "likelihood-of-harm" is insufficient, and the
other being that proof of actual economic harm is not required. As far as
providing guidance as to how "actual harm" should be interpreted, the
Court did state that "the mere fact that consumers mentally associate the
junior user's mark with a famous mark" would not be sufficient proof to
establish actionable dilution, at least where the marks at issue are not

7. See H.R. REP No. 104-374, at 2 (1995) ("The purpose of [the FTDA] is to protect famous
trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it,
even in the absence of confusion."), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1029. The Supreme
Court itself implied that it doubted that tamishment was actually embraced by the statutory text. See
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1124 (2003). However, in
Justice Kennedy's separate concurrence, perhaps to reassure trademark owners that the FTDA does
recognize tarnishment, he stated, "[t]he Court's opinion does not foreclose injunctive relief if
respondents on remand present sufficient evidence of either blurring or tamishment." Id. at 1126.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
9. See discussion infra Part V.B.
10. Compare Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 461 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that actual harm must be proven), overruled in
part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003), with Nabisco,
Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 228 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that a likelihood of harm must be
proven), overruled in part by Moseley 537 U.S. 418, 123 S. Ct. 1115.
11. 537 U.S. 418, 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003).
12. See id.at 1124.
13. See id.
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identical, 14 and that 'direct evidence of dilution such as consumer
surveys will not be necessary if actual dilution can reliably be proven
through circumstantial evidence."' 15 Because the Court did not elaborate
on what factors should be taken into consideration in adjudicating a
claim of trademark dilution, much room in the middle was left for
trademark practitioners, and in turn the lower courts, to determine and
formulate the acceptable levels and forms of proof that will establish the
requisite "actual harm."
The purpose of this Note is to demonstrate why the "actual harm"
requirement should not be interpreted the same for blurring and
tarnishing under the FTDA based on the inherent differences between
them. Part II of this Note will introduce the concept of trademarks and
the trademark infringement cause of action. Part III outlines the history
of dilution and the passage of the FTDA. Part IV examines the
differences between blurring and tarnishing through examples found in
case law. Part V discusses two decisions of the New York State Court of
Appeals wherein it implicitly applied the dichotomous standard
approach proposed by this Note in interpreting the New York antidilution statute. Additionally, Part V analyzes each of the major
trademark dilution decisions where the circuit courts disagreed. The
issue presented in this "circuit split" differed from others in that courts
on both sides of the issue were technically correct; at least to the extent
that they held different levels of proof of actual harm were applicable to
the "causes dilution" requirement based on whether the facts presented
blurring or tarnishing. The analysis of the cases will focus
predominantly on the type of harm caused under the facts of the case, the
standard/level of proof used by the court, and how the courts, without
explicitly stating so, were also implementing the dichotomous standard
approach proposed by this Note.16 Part V concludes by proposing an
interpretation of the FTDA that would institute the lower level of actual
harm for tarnishment and the higher level of proof of actual harm for
blurring, including the relevant factors that could be used by the courts
in determining whether that particular level of proof has been met. The
interpretation of the FTDA proposed will provide sufficient protection to
famous marks as contemplated by Congress when enacting the FTDA
and will not grant owners of famous marks the ability to enjoin all uses
of its mark on all products as if it owned a property right in the mark

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See discussion infra Part V.C.
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itself. This property-right-in-gross theory of trademarks has been
appropriately rejected by courts on both sides of the issue and is not
implicated by the interpretation proposed by this Note.' 7 The proposal
suggests that a higher level of proof of "actual harm" is better suited for
dilution caused by blurring, while a lower level of proof of "actual
harm" should be applicable to claims of dilution caused by tarnishing,
because tarnishing is more likely to cause damage to the senior user's
mark and will tend to occur more quickly than the harm caused by
blurring.
II.

A.

TRADEMARK BACKGROUND

TrademarkProtection:History and Purpose

Society has been using marks and symbols to denote ownership and
origin of articles since well before the existence of the term
"trademarks" and statutes regulating their use. 18 Trademarks serve an
important purpose in the production of goods by allowing the
manufacturer to adopt a mark indicating either the origin or ownership
of the goods produced and distinguishing them from a similar product
made by another manufacturer. 19 In addition to serving as an indicator of
origin, trademarks function as an implied statement of quality, 2enabling
0
consumers to distinguish the products they want from all others.
Today, the term trademark is defined as "any word, name, symbol,
or device, or any combination thereof ... [used] to identify and
distinguish his or her goods ...from those manufactured or sold by
17. See Ringling Bros.-Bamum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev.,
170 F.3d 449, 459 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e simply cannot believe that ...Congress could have
intended ... to create property rights in gross, unlimited in time[,] ... even in 'famous'
trademarks."); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224 n.6 (2d Cir. 1999) (agreeing with
the Fourth Circuit that the dilution statutes do not create a property right in gross).
18.

See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 5:1, at 5-1 (4th ed. 2002) (noting that humans have used symbols to identify ownership or origin
of articles for thousands of years). McCarthy states that the earliest form of use of marks involved
the branding of cattle and other animals as well as quarry marks and stone cutter's signs found in
Egyptian structures that have existed since as early as 4000 B.C. See id; see also generally Frank I.
Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927) (providing
additional relevant history of the use of marks to identify goods).
19.

See AMASA C. PAUL, THE LAW OF TRADE-MARKS INCLUDING TRADE-NAMES AND

UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7, at 13 (1903).
20. See S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 1 (1946) (stating that the purpose of the enactment in 1946 of
the federal trademark statute, the Lanham Act, was "to protect the public so it may be confident
that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get
the product which it asks for and wants to get"), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.S. 1274, 1274.
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others and to indicate the source of the goods .... 21 The protection of
trademarks is not only important to protect the investment made by the
owner of the mark, but also because of the benefits the use of trademarks
confers on consumers in general. This dual purpose of the trademark
function, specifically the promotion of competition and the maintenance
of product quality, is important and has been recognized by the United
States Supreme Court.22 Consumers rely on trademarks in many of their
purchasing decisions.23 As long as consumers understand the mark as
designating the origin of the product, it is unnecessary for them to know
the name of the manufacturer.24 Trademarks greatly reduce the cost and
time spent shopping, though many consumers may not realize it, by
allowing them to make quicker purchasing decisions. 25 Trademarks also
serve an important function in the overall marketplace by encouraging
manufacturers to strive to produce quality products.26 The manufacturers
are ensured that they will reap the benefits of their own hard work by
prohibiting subsequent users from "free riding" on the manufacturer's
mark and the goodwill associated with that mark.27 Therefore, the
rationale for protecting trademarks is the equity concept of preventing

21. 15U.S.C.§ 1127(1994).
22. See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985).
23. See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 24:68, at 24-120 ("[A] trademark is merely a symbol
that allows a purchaser to identify goods or services that have been satisfactory in the past and reject
goods that have failed to give satisfaction.").
24. See MARTIN J. BERAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO TRADEMARK PRACTICE 1 (1970) (A
trademark exists when "the consumer immediately associates the product sold in the distinctive
container [or bearing the same mark] as being of a consistent quality ... from a particular single
source, irrespective of whether the company name of that source is known to the purchaser.");
FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS

166 (1925) ("[T]he public is concerned with the trade-mark not so much as an indication of origin
but as a guaranty of quality.").
25. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) (noting that
[T]rademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark,
reduce[s] the customer's costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions.
[Consumers are assured] that this item-the item with the mark-is made by the same
producer as other marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past.
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original)).
26. See S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 1 (1946) (stating that the purpose of the enactment in 1946 of
the federal trademark statute, the Lanham Act, was to protect "the owner of a trade-mark [who] has
spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the product ... in his investment from its
misappropriation by pirates and cheats."), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.S. 1274, 1274; MCCARTHY,
supranote 18, § 2:3, at 2-3.
27. See Gerard N. Magliocca, One and Inseparable: Dilution and Infringement in Trademark
Law, 85 MINN. L. REV. 949, 958 (2001) ("Marks also encourage producers to invest in quality by
ensuring that they will reap the benefit of a fine reputation. Without trademark protection,
competitors could poach on the goodwill of a firm by putting that firm's mark on their own goods.")
(footnote omitted).
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someone from "reaping a harvest which others have sown., 28 The owner
of a well-known trademark has the additional advantage of using the
mark to advertise its product and the ability to license others to use it
under certain circumstances-each resulting in the expansion of the
overall business. 29 Finally, a business can further expand into new
product areas through the use of trademarks because consumers are more
willing to try new products bearing an established trademark than a
product from an unproven source.30
B. Trademark Infringement
When a trademark owner brings an infringement action, it is
seeking to prevent a junior user from using the same or a confusingly
similar mark on the same or closely related good or service, in the same
geographical area, or within a natural area of expansion. 31 The trademark
owner's primary concern is that it will lose revenue when a consumer
mistakenly purchases the goods and services bearing the confusingly
similar mark, while believing it to be originating from the source of the
original mark.32 The owner is also concerned that consumers purchasing
these other products, which may be of a shoddy quality, will attribute the
lack of quality to goods of the original mark, and decline to purchase any

28. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 497-98 (2d Cir. 1961) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
29. See RUDOLF CALLMANN,

THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION,

TRADEMARKS AND

MONOPOLIES § 21.11, at 33 (Louis Altman ed., 4th ed. 1992) ("A trademark is part of the
commercial equipment of a business, and may prove to be a singularly effective weapon in the
competitive arsenal."); Schechter, supra note 18, at 823 ("[O]nce a mark has come to indicate to the
public a constant and uniform source of satisfaction, its owner should be allowed the broadest scope
possible for 'the natural expansion of his trade' to other lines or fields of enterprise."); see also
WILLIAM G. BARBER ET AL, THE FRANCHISE TRADEMARK HANDBOOK: DEVELOPING AND
PROTECTING YOUR TRADEMARKS AND SERVICE MARKS I (Louis T. Pirkey ed. 1994) (noting that

franchising is a multi-billion-dollar business and that the trademarks form the foundation of that
industry. When corporations use marks in connection with their products, consumers recognize a
system rather than a collection of distinct units, which makes the marks of the franchise powerful
selling tools).
30. A product bearing the mark has the effect of alerting consumers that the origin of the
goods is the same single source as of the high-quality goods they are familiar with and expect. See
Schechter, supra note 18, at 819 ("[T]he trademark is not merely the symbol of good will but often
the most effective agent for the creation of good will, imprinting upon the public mind an
anonymous and impersonal guaranty of satisfaction, creating a desire for further satisfactions.").
31. See JANE C. GINSBURG ET AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 47 (3d ed.
2001).
32. See Erin S. Dufek, Comment, The Same Uniform, A Different Team: Copycats Suit Up
For Competition, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1317, 1317-18 (1997).
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products bearing that mark.33 Worse yet, these same consumers could
express their unhappiness to others who have not yet been confused by
the mark, but may discontinue use of the products bearing the same
mark based on that information.34 Trademark owners are also concerned
that while the confusing mark is not being used on a good or service it
currently produces or offers, it is being used
in an area the owner's
35
business may logically expand into over time.
There are three factors analyzed by courts in a trademark
infringement action, specifically, the distinctiveness of the mark, the
priority of the marks and the "likelihood of confusion." The second
factor, the priority of the competing marks, 36 is less relevant for the
purpose of discussing dilution because the FTDA specifies that the
junior use of the mark must begin after the senior mark becomes famous.
While in infringement, depending on which mark has priority, it is
possible that an otherwise infringing mark will be permitted to remain in
existence in a limited area.37 The final factor, whether there is a
"likelihood of confusion," is the linchpin of the infringement cause of
action.38 When determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion
courts attempt to "balance the equities" by weighing the interests of the
senior user, the junior user, and the public consumer.3 9
The first factor in analyzing infringement, the distinctiveness of the
mark, is the very cornerstone of the dilution claim-specifically, claims
of blurring-and therefore merits greater explanation. 40 Trademarks can

33. See Magliocca, supra note 27, at 1000 ("If the junior user's goods are lousy ...the
quality information conveyed by the mark is also affirmatively diminished by the negative
associations consumers might make with the senior user's products.").
34. See Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protectionof Trade
Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1186 (1948) ("[T]he disappointed expectations of buyers will
presumably be vented against any article bearing the symbol. Thus the [mark owner] loses present
and perhaps future sales.").
35. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 497 (2d Cir. 1961). For
example, using the same or similar mark found on pancake mix and placing it on a bottle syrup is
more likely to confuse consumers than if that same or similar mark was placed on clothing. See,
e.g., Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, 409-10 (2d Cir. 1917).
36. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 16:1-48 (discussing the element of priority,
specifically, how it is established and how it can be lost).
37. See id.
38. See Lynda J. Oswald, "Tarnishment" and "Blurring" Under the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 255, 259 (1999) ("'[L]ikelihood of confusion' is the key
[element] to an infringement claim.").
39. See Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189, 1195 (E.D.N.Y.
1983).
40. The greater degree of uniqueness the mark has, the stronger the mark is considered and
because the blur "lessen[s] the uniqueness of the [famous senior mark]," there is a need for
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be classified into four categories: fanciful, arbitrary, suggestive, and
descriptive. 4 ' How a particular trademark is classified will determine if it
is worthy of trademark protection, when it will be received, and how
much protection it will be afforded. Those marks classified as fanciful,
arbitrary and suggestive are considered inherently distinctive and are
therefore regarded as capable of functioning immediately upon adoption
as a symbol of origin. 42 Marks that are descriptive-that is, marks that
describe a quality, characteristic, function or ingredient of the good or
services in connection with which it is used 43 - as well as geographically
descriptive marks 44 and surnames 45 - are not initially eligible for
trademark protection because they lack inherent distinctiveness (i.e., the
capability of identifying a particular source from the first use.) 46 Despite
lacking inherent distinctiveness, these marks can receive protection upon
the acquisition of secondary meaning,
which attaches when a
significant number of prospective purchasers understand the term as an
indication of association with a particular source, when used in
connection with a particular good, service, or organization.48
There are also marks that are classified as generic. 49 These marks
are not capable of serving the trademark function because they are used
as the common name of the product or service, such as the use of word
"salt" on a box of table salt. Consequently, such marks cannot be
protected.50 It is important to point out that generic marks encompass not
only those that consumers would recognize immediately as being
generic, but include marks that once enjoyed full trademark protection
which have lost all of their distinctive quality because consumers use the
trademark as the name of the product. 5' This unfavorable outcome can
occur in various ways, the first being where the owner of the trademark

protection from such junior users. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d
1160, 1168 (1lth Cir. 1982).
41. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
42. See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 15:1, at 15-5.
43. See BERAN, supra note 24, at 7.
44. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2) (1994).
45. See id. § 1052(e)(4).
46. See Two Pesos, Inc., v. Taco Cabana, Inc. 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992).
47. See id.
48. See id. at 766 n.4.
49. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc. 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
50. See, e.g., Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) ("Marks
that constitute a common descriptive name are referred to as generic. A generic term is one that
refers to the genus of which the particular product is a species. Generic marks are not registrable [as
trademarks].").
51. See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 12:1,at 12-6.
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fails to police the mark, thereby allowing widespread usage by
competitors, which in turn leads consumers to believe that the mark is
the common descriptive name of the good.52 A trademark can also
become generic where the manufacturer of a product is the first to
market such a product, and because there is nothing to compare it to,
consumers refer to this new product by the name the manufacturer
intended to serve as its trademark. 53 The latter path to generic-ness can
be avoided from the onset if the manufacturer listens to counsel, instead
of its marketing executives, by using the trademark properly-that is, as
a proper adjective, not as a noun-by including its own generic term for
the product54after the word or phrase the manufacturer considers to be its
trademark.
For dilution purposes, the distinctiveness of the mark is particularly
relevant, specifically the type caused by blurring, which is the reduction
of a mark's distinctiveness, because if the famous mark is sufficiently
blurred it could become generic resulting in the cancellation of the
mark. 55 Therefore, it is imperative for the owner of a famous trademark
to attempt to prevent the use of the same or very similar mark by others
on both competing and non-competing goods because even if the mark
does not become technically generic, widespread uses of a same or
similar mark will undoubtedly cause the mark to lose its uniqueness.56
III. HISTORY OF DILUTION LAW
"[I]f you allow Rolls Royce restaurants, and Rolls Royce cafeterias
and Rolls Royce pants, and Rolls Royce candy, in [ten] years you will
52. See, e.g., Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S. PAT. Q. 80, 81 (1950) (holding
that the mark "ESCALATOR" had become the generic name for the device).
53. Examples of marks that have now become generic because of this second reason include
"'aspirin,' 'cellophane,' and 'escalator."' MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 12:1, at 12-6.
54. See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 12:27, at 12-79. When the trademark "JELL-O" was in
danger of becoming a generic term because of many years of the use of the phrase "Everyone loves
JELL-O," the manufacturer had to change the public perception, thus the use of "JELL-O ® brand
gelatin." The use of the phrase "make a Xerox of this" became so prevalent that the Xerox
Corporation placed numerous advertisements basically pleading with consumers to stop using its
trademark in that fashion. See id. § 12.26, at 12-78.
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1994); Park 'NFly, 469 U.S. at 194.
56. See CALLMANN, supra note 29, § 21.11, at 34-35.
Should the trademark owner sanction or acquiesce in the continued use of a similar mark
by others, he assumes the risk that the resulting dilution will render. his mark
nondistinctive or generic and freely available for common use. That, of course, writes
finis to the distinctiveness of a mark. Accordingly, the fate of a trademark may be
dependent upon the alertness of the trademark owner in guarding its uniqueness and the
alacrity with which he acts against imitations.
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not have the Rolls Royce mark anymore.""7 It appears to be well-settled
among the courts and commentators that the introduction of the concept
of trademark dilution in the United States is attributable to a Harvard
Law Review article 58 written by Frank I. Schechter.59 Though Schechter
never referred to his idea as trademark dilution, he stated "the
preservation of the uniqueness of a trademark" was the only rational
basis for the mark's protection. 60 Schechter was concerned that the use
of certain marks on goods, while not actionable as trademark
infringement because the subsequent use of the mark on a product would
not cause consumers to believe the product originated from the same
manufacturer, would cause the senior user's mark to become diluted. 61
He reasoned that the trademark would lose its "uniqueness," thereby
relegating it to the commonplace of words of the language. 62 According
to Schechter, protection from trademark dilution was warranted because
of the large capital expenditures made by owners of trademarks to
introduce the mark to consumers "as a symbol and guarantee of the
excellence of the quality of the product" bearing the mark.63
Usually the owner of a trademark has a limited property right in his
trademark-that is, merely the right to exclude others from using the
same or similar mark in any manner that would cause harm to consumers
as a result of source confusion. 64 Dilution-the idea that there should be
57. Walter J. Derenberg, The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Antidilution Statutes, 44
CAL. L. REV. 439, 449 (1956) (quoting Hearings Before the House Comm. on Patents, 72nd Cong.,
1st Sess. 15 (1932) (statement of Frank 1.Schechter)).
58. See generally Schechter, supra note 18.
59. See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1028 (2d
Cir. 1989) (referring to Frank 1. Schechter as the "father of the dilution theory"); Ringling Bros.Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 453 (4th Cir.
1999) ("The concept of trademark 'dilution' as distinct from 'infringement' is commonly traced ...
to Frank I. Schechter."), overruled in part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418,
123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003); Westchester Media Co. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 935,
973 (S.D. Tex. 1999) ("Without revisiting the political and philosophical disputes that led to [the
FTDA], it is enough to observe that it springs from an idea that originated with Professor Frank
Schechter, in 1927."), aff'd in part and vacated and remanded in part, 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000).
60. Schechter, supra note 18, at 831. For a thorough discussion of Professor Schecter's
theory, see Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 453.
61. See Schechter, supra note 18, at 830; see also L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc.,
811 F.2d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1987) ("Anti-dilution statutes have developed to fill a void left by the
failure of trademark infringement law to curb unauthorized use of marks where there is no
likelihood of confusion between the original use and the infringing use.").
62. See Schechter, supra note 18, at 830. Schechter's argument here is the prevention of
"genericism." See discussion supra Part lI.B.
63. See Schechter, supra note 24, at 171. Schechter believed that these owners of these types
of trademarks "should receive the same protection from the courts for his investment ... that he
would undoubtedly be entitled to receive for investment in plant or materials." Id.
64. See Oswald, supra note 38, at 261.
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protection afforded to the owners of a select group of trademarks-is
dramatically different from the primary focus of traditional unfair
competition law. 65 At least one commentator has described the dilution
cause of action as similar to the tort of trespass to property.6 6 It is the
change from the traditional idea of trademarks combined with the
precise and subtle nature of dilution that has puzzled courts from the
outset as to just exactly what interest dilution statutes seek to protect.6 7
Nonetheless, Schechter's reasoning that dilution is a specific and distinct
claim from infringement and therefore requires an adequate remedy
remains true to this day.68
Long before the enactment of the FTDA, there were failed attempts
to enact a dilution statute on the federal level - first by separate
legislation and again at the time of the passage of the 1946 Lanham
Act.69 The decision not to create a federal claim for dilution left it to
individual states to enact statutes to provide an adequate remedy for
dilution. 70 The first such state statute was enacted by Massachusetts in
1947. 7 1 By the time the FTDA was enacted in 1996, about half of the
states had enacted similar anti-dilution statutes. 72 The source of all but
one of those states' antidilution provisions is section 12 of the Model
State Trademark Bill, promulgated by the United States Trademark
Association (now the International Trademark Association),7 3 which
reads:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the
distinctive quality of a mark registered under this Act, or a mark valid
at common law, or a trade name valid at common law, shall be a
ground for injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence of competition

65. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989). This
statement is probably more accurate for blurring than for tarnishment because, as will be shown,
tamishment may be actually found somewhere in the middle. See discussion infra Part V.C. 1.
66. See Oswald, supra note 38, at 262.
67. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev.,
170 F.3d 449, 456 (4th Cir. 1999), overruled in part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537
U.S. 418, 123 S.Ct. 1115 (2003).
68. See I.P. Lund Trading ApS Kroin Inc. v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 48 (1st Cir. 1998)
("Dilution laws are intended to address specific harms; they are not intended to serve as mere
fallback protection for trademark owners unable to prove trademark infringement.").
69. See Oswald, supra note 38, at 265.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 266 n.59 (listing each state's respective anti-dilution statute).
73. See Robert S. Nelson, Unravelingthe Trademark Rope: Tarnishmentand its ProperPlace
in the Laws of Unfair Competition, 42 IDEA 133, 146 (2002) (citation omitted).
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between the parties
or the absence of confusion as to the source of
74
goods or services.

Initially, the state courts were hesitant to apply these statutes
"because of their fear that the uncertain boundaries of dilution theory
would in effect grant the trademark holder a monopoly in the mark and
would restrict free competition."" In fact, there were very few cases
decided under these anti-dilution statutes prior to 1977, when the New
York Court of Appeals decided Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied
Mechanical Trades, Inc.76 As the use of trademarks increased nationally,
the need for a federal statute 'to bring uniformity to the dilution cause of
action became apparent for two reasons. 77 First, forum-shopping became
prevalent because only half of the states recognized a claim for
trademark dilution. 78 Second, there was reluctance on the part of the
state courts to grant nationwide injunctions for violation of state antidilution law. 79 The foregoing resulted in Congress finally attempting
to
8
remedy these inconsistencies by enacting a federal cause of action. 0
It was not until January 1996, almost seventy years after the
publication of Schechter's article and approximately fifty years after the
enactment of the first state anti-dilution statute, that Congress finally
recognized a cause of action for trademark dilution. In a House Report, it
was acknowledged that a federal' anti-dilution statute was necessary
"because famous marks ordinarily are used on a nationwide basis and
dilution protection is currently only available on a patch-quilt system of
protection, in that only approximately twenty-five states have laws that
prohibit trademark dilution." 81 The FTDA, as enacted, varied slightly
from the state statutes, with a stricter requirement that
the senior mark be
83
82 rather than just distinctive or well-known.
famous
74. Id.
75. Oswald, supranote 38, at 267.
76. See id. at 267-68.
77. See id. at 269.
78. See MCCARTHY, supranote 18, § 24:75.
79. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030; see
also Oswald, supra note 38, at 269 (noting that state courts were concerned with the extra-territorial
effect of the injunctions they issued - with some uncertainty surrounding their enforceability in
states without dilution statutes); JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, § 5.12,

at 5-229-30 (2001) (noting that the courts that issued nationwide injunctions forced owners of
famous national marks to file multiple suits in order to protect their marks from dilution).
80. "Attempting" is the' operative word, since there is still inconsistency among the
jurisdictions as a result of the varying application of the FTDA by the circuit courts.
81. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
82. In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider factors
such as, but not limited to:
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A successful claim for dilution begins with finding the marks
sufficiently similar.8 4 Though most examples of dilution are given with
the identical trademark being used on other goods and services, it is not
necessary for the marks to be identical. 85 The owner of the famous mark
must demonstrate that the marks are "very or substantially similar," as
opposed to "confusingly similar," which is the standard for trademark
infringement. 86 Even if the marks are similar enough, the FTDA requires
the trademark owner to prove its claim of dilution by presenting
sufficient evidence that: (1) the mark is famous, (2) the mark is
distinctive,87 (3) the allegedly diluting use of the mark was adopted after
its mark became famous, (4) the other party's use is in commerce, and
(5) the other party is causing dilution to the famous mark.88 It is the
interpretation of this last element that caused the split among the circuit
courts, and the primary reason the Supreme Court weighed in on the
issue.

(A) the degree of inherent or'acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or services
with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used
by the marks' owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third panics; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of
February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
15 U.S.C. § I 125(c)(1)(a)-(h) (Supp. V 2000).
83. See Oswald, supra note 38, at 271.
84. See Mead Data Cent., Inc., v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1030 (2d
Cir. 1989) (concluding that the marks were not sufficiently similar enough to find dilution).
85. See Luigino's, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 1999) ("To support an
action for dilution by blurring, 'the marks must be similar enough that a significant segment of the
target group of consumers sees the two marks as essentially the same."').
86. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 218 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Mead Data,
875 F.2d at 1029), overruled in part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 123 S.
Ct. 1115 (2003).
87. This factor has not been adopted by all circuits. Compare Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215
("Distinctiveness in a mark is a characteristic quite different from fame. It is quite clear that the
[FTDA] intends distinctiveness, in addition to fame, as an essential element."), with Times Mirror
Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, 212 F.3d 157, 167 (3rd Cir. 2000) ("[W]e are not
persuaded that a mark be subject to separate tests for fame and distinctiveness.").
88. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. V 2000).
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THE HARMS CAUSED BY DILUTION

A.

Blurring

"Blurring" is considered the classic or "traditional" form of
dilution, 89 and the type that most closely resembles the theory of dilution
advanced by Schechter in his influential article. 90 The harm caused by
blurring is the diminution in the capability of the famous mark to
identify and distinguish the source of goods and services. 9' Blurring
occurs when the junior user's goods and services are identified by a
mark that is the same as, or at least strikingly similar to, the mark used
by the senior user. 92 This causes the famous mark to lose its ability to
serve as a unique identifier of the senior user's goods. The classic
examples used to illustrate famous marks being blurred are Dupont
shoes, Buick aspirin, Schlitz varnish, and Kodak pianos.93
State statutes (and now the FTDA) protect that unique and
distinctive link between the famous mark and a particular line of goods
or services. 94 While most of the cases involving dilution by blurring
involve a junior user using the mark on different products, resulting in
the diminution of the consumer's mental association between the
trademark and goods,95 some blurring cases involve competing goods
that involve what might properly be classified as a "failed trademark
infringement" cause of action. 96 The inherent difference between
trademark infringement and dilution caused by blurring was illustrated
89. See MCCARTHY, supranote 18, § 2:3, at 2-3.
90. See Patrick M. Bible, Comment, Defining and Quantifying Dilution Under the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Using Survey Evidence to Show Actual Dilution, 70 U. COLO. L.

REV. 295, 330 (1999).
91. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. V 2000) (defining "dilution" as the "lessening of the
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services") Though this is the
definition of "dilution" as defined in the FTDA, it seems to be closer to blurring than tamishment.
See also Schechter, supra note 18, at 825 (describing blurring as "the gradual whittling away or
dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon noncompeting goods.").

92. See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39,43 (2d Cir. 1994).
93.

See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d Cir. 1989).

These very same examples were offered by Congress in the legislative history of the FTDA. See 141
CONG. REC. H 14,317 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moorhead).
94. See Luigino's, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 1999).
95. See Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 625 F. Supp. 48, 56 (D.N.M. 1985) ("The

paradigmatic dilution case involves the situation where the same or very similar marks are being
used on vastly different products.").

96. See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999) (competing fishshaped cheddar-flavored crackers), overruled in part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537
U.S. 418, 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003).
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by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Viacom Inc. v. Ingram
Enterprises, Inc. 97 In the hypothetical scenario offered by the court, a

parent says to her children "' [1let's go pick something out at Blockbuster
tonight,"' and while the parent means the video store, the "youngest
child assumes they will be buying fireworks made by Viacom," and the
older child asks the parent "'[w]hich Blockbuster?' ' 98 The-younger
child's response is evidence of the confusion that is essential to a claim
of trademark infringement9 9 while the older child's question evidenced
dilution caused by blurring.' 00
This injury materially differs from tarnishment because of the speed
at which tarnishment occurs and its initial impact on the famous mark.'0 '
Though the injury caused by blurring is just as palpable as that caused
by tarnishment, the need for the higher level of proof of actual harm is
necessary to prevent a highly undesirable result. That is, allowing the
owner of the famous mark to gain a monopoly over the use of that mark
on all products and services. 10 2 Finally, the reason that the use of marks
that actually cause blurring to famous marks needs to be enjoined is best
explained by the following quote:
[T]he erosion of the distinctiveness and prestige of a trademark caused
by the sale of other goods or services under the same name ... or
simply a proliferation of borrowings that, while not degrading the
original seller's mark, are so numerous
as to deprive the mark of its
1
distinctiveness and hence impact[]. 03
B. Tarnishing
"Tarnishing" can best be differentiated from blurring by
expounding on the "Blockbuster" hypothetical. 0 4 Assume that the father
of the two children is in the car when the mother says "[l]et's go pick
something out at Blockbuster tonight." The father responds by saying he
refuses to patronize an establishment that is behind the production of
"BLOCKBUSTER" brand-name adult themed paraphernalia. Though he
97. 141 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 1998).
98. Id. at 891 n.9.
99. This is not meant to say that trademark infringement is presently based solely on evidence
of actual confusion. As previously stated, the court must balance the "likelihood of confusion"
factors which include evidence of actual confusion. See discussion supra Part ll.B.
100. See Viacom, 141 F.3d at 891 n.9.
101. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
102. See discussion infra Part V.C.2.
103. 111.High Sch. Ass'n v. GTE Vantage Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 247 (7th Cir. 1996) (dicta).
104. See discussion supraPart IV.A.
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has no affirmative proof that the owner of the famous mark, whoever it
may be, is in any way connected with this new business enterprise, he
"believes" there must be some connection because he saw an
advertisement on late-night television. It is important that in this
hypothetical scenario the father first made the connection with the senior
user's famous mark and then proceeded to attribute the unsavory
characteristics of the subsequent
use with it.' 0 5 That is the fundamental
06
1
attribute of tarnishment.
The harm inflicted upon a famous mark by tamishment "generally
arises when the [famous] trademark.., is portrayed in an unwholesome
or unsavory context likely to evoke unflattering thoughts about the
owner's product."' 0 7 Other ways a famous mark can be tarnished include
the linking of a famous trademark to products considered to be of
shoddy quality'1 8 or grossly inconsistent with the senior user's image109
105. See Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 192 F. Supp 2d 790, 807 (W.D. Tenn. 2001) ("On
the other hand, dilution 'by tamishment' entails more than merely associating two marks together.
This type of dilution only occurs if the junior mark is used in a context that degrades or debases the
senior mark associated with it.").
106. See Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996)
("The sine qua non of tarnishment is a finding that plaintiff's mark will suffer negative associations
through defendant's use.").
107. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994). Many of the cases
involving tamishment involve the use of a famous mark in a context involving sexual activity,
obsencity, or illegal activity. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., No. C78-679A,
1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17722, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 1981) (showing the trade characters
"Poppin' Fresh" and "Poppie Fresh" engaging in sexual acts); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Rakow, 739 F.
Supp. 116, 118 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (using the stage name KODAK in a comedy act involving
references to sex and bodily functions as well as other crude, off-color humor); Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467 F. Supp. 366, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 604 F.2d
200 (2d Cir. 1979) (using the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleader uniform in a pornographic film); CocaCola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (using Coca-Cola's
famous red-and-white color scheme and distinctive stylized script lettering for the slogan "Enjoy
Cocaine" in place of Coca-Cola's familiar slogan "Enjoy Coca-Cola").
108. See Deere, 41 F.3d at 43 (noting that tarnishment can be found where the plaintiff's
famous trademark is linked to products of shoddy quality).
109. See Steinway & Sons v. Demars & Friends, No. 80-04404, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15169,
at * 14-15 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 1981) (claiming that the prestigious Steinway (piano) mark had been
tarnished by the maker of the "Stein-way" clip-on beer handles). The court held that it was
inevitable that the defendant's use of the mark, unless enjoined, would "inevitably tarnish plaintiff's
reputation and image with the public of manufacturing and/or sponsoring only products and
activities of taste, quality and distinction." Id. (emphasis added). The Court came to this conclusion
because the
[d]efendants' use of the designation STEIN-WAY in connection with its business and on
its products [would tend to make consumers] associate or tend to associate
plaintiff's
high quality pianos and plaintiffs business and cultural activities
with
defendants'
inexpensive, mass-produced products and with the retail liquor stores, supermarkets and
similar merchandising concerns which sell defendants' products.
Id. at * 14. It should be noted that this type of tarnishment is not without its limitations. See e.g.,

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol31/iss4/12

16

Galvano: There Is No "Rational Basis" for Keeping It a "Secret" Anymore: W

20031

THE FTDA 'S "ACTUAL HARM" REQUIREMENT

1229

or where a manufacturer's own mark and product is being sold by
others, though it was established that the products failed to comply with
the manufacturer's quality control standards for freshness." 1 The
immediacy of the harm caused by tarnishment and the gravity of that
harm is best understood by parsing examples found in case law. It has
been stated, "[t]he speed at which single acts of tarnishing can affect
consumers makes tarnishing significantly more dangerous than blurring
to a mark's commercial value.""' The immediate harm inflicted upon
business reputation and corporate good will that results from tarnishment
was emphasized by the United Stated District Court for the Eastern
District of New York in Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc.' 12 when it
stated:
[A] strong probability exists that some patrons of [the senior user] will
be 'turned off rather than 'turned on' by [the junior user's] so-called
'spoof,' with resulting immeasurable loss to [the senior user] ....[The
senior user's] good will and business reputation are likely to suffer in
the eyes of those who, believing it responsible for [junior user's mark],
113
will refuse to deal with [the senior user's] company ....
In general, most courts have recognized the gravity of the harm by
finding the existence of tarnishment where the famous mark has been
used by the junior user in the context of sexual activity, obscenity, or
illegal activity. 1 4 The ever increasing use of the Internet has produced
Exxon Corp. v. Oxxford Clothes, Inc., 109 F.3d 1070 (5th Cir. 1997) (rejecting claim of dilution
based upon Exxon's poor corporate image). Oxxford argued that certain past acts of the Exxon
Corporation caused tamishment to its mark "OXXFORD," because of the use of "EXXON." The
court observed:
[This argument] ignore[d] the distinction between the use of the appellation 'EXXON'
as a device of corporate identity and its use as a trade name or trademark, i.e., as an
indicator of origin and/or quality of particular goods and services. The 'acts' which
comprise the basis of Oxxford's claim, such as the Exxon Valdez spill and resulting jury
verdict, bear no relationship to the quality or reputation of the products sold or services
provided under cover of Exxon's marks (or to the quality or reputation of products sold
or services provided under Oxxford's marks).
Id. at 1083.
110. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Northside Dev. Corp., 86 F.3d 3, 6 (2d Cir. 1996)
("Distribution of a product that does not meet the trademark holder's quality control standards may
result in the devaluation of the mark by tarnishing its image."). Though this was not a trademark
dilution case, it is important because it shows that tarnishment can occur in many different ways.
Ill. Recent Cases, Trademark Law-Federal Trademark Dilution Act- Sixth Circuit Holds That
Plaintiffs Need Not Show Actual Harm To Prove Dilution. - V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley,
259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir.2001), 115 HARV. L. REV. 731, 735 (2001).
112. 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y.1972).
113. Id. at 1190, 91.
114. See Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 192 F. Supp. 2d 790, 809 (W.D. Tenn. 2001).
Although courts have stated that tarnishment can occur whenever 'the goodwill and
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many examples of dilution caused by tamishment where the junior user
adopts a famous trademark for use on an adult-themed website." 5 In
cases involving dilution by tarnishment, as it relates to the use of the
Internet, it has not been necessary for the junior user to have used the
famous mark in the domain name so long as the mark was being used
somewhere in connection with the website." 6
In Helm, the court held that the mark "KING VELVEEDA" used
on the junior user's website to advertise his artwork, tarnished the
famous "VELVEETA" mark used on Kraft's cheese products. The
junior user's website depicted graphic sexuality and nudity alongside
images of drug use and paraphernalia." 7 The court noted these images
"conflict with the image that [the owner of the famous trademark] has
successfully cultivated for more than [seventy-nine] years as a
wholesome, family oriented product." 118 The immediate harm being
caused to the senior user's famous mark is this very idea of conflicting
images in the minds of consumers. The harm is of the corrosive type
because the association the consumer makes between the owner of the
famous mark and the tarnishing use causes the former to lose the
reputation and good will it once enjoyed. 119 It is the court's ability to
observe and appreciate the gravity of the harm being inflicted on the
famous mark that has resulted in owners of famous marks having greater

reputation of a plaintiffs trademark is [sic] linked to products which are of shoddy
quality or which conjure associations that clash with the associations generated by the
owners lawful use of the mark,'
they usually find tamishment only in cases where a
distinctive mark is depicted in an obviously degrading context, often involving a sexual
activity, obscenity, or illegal activity.
Id. (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
115. See, e.g., Hasbro, Inc., v. Internet Entm't Group, Ltd., No. C96-13OWD, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11626, at *3-4 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 1996) (enjoining use of "CANDYLAND.COM" for a
sexually explicit interet site because it tarnished Hasbro's famous trademark "CANDYLAND").
116. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. JCOM, Inc., No. 97 CIV. 7191 (SS), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16195, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1998) (using the trademark "Barbie's Playhouse" on defendant's
adult themed website found at http://www.jcomlive.com/barbie.htm); Mattel, Inc., v. Internet
Dimensions, Inc., No. 99 CIV. 10066 (HB), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9747, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 13,
2000) (using the domain name "barbiesplaypen.com"); Kraft Foods Holdings, Inc., v. Helm, 205 F.
Supp. 2d 942, 944 (N.D. 111.2002) (using the trademark "VELVEETA" on defendant's adult
themed website that could be found at http://www.cheesygraphics.com); Toys "R" Us, Inc., v.
Akkaoui, No. C 96-3381 CW, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17090, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 1996) (using
domain name "ADULTS RUS.COM" on an adult-themed website found to tarnish the mark "TOYS
'R' US").

117. See Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 949.
118. Id. at 949-50 ("The two similar marks would cause consumers to associate [the famous
mark] with [the defendant's] arguably offensive product, thereby tarnishing the ... mark.").
119. Seeid.at950.
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1 20
success enjoining uses that tarnish their mark rather than blur it.

Therefore, for all the reasons stated above, it might be better to refer to
this harm as a "lethal injection" rather than a "cancer," '1 21 which might
imply damage that takes place over a longer period of time. The
instantaneous nature of the harm caused by tarnishing is the very reason
that a lower
level of actual harm is more appropriate-and indeed
22
necessary.'

V.

THE NEED FOR TWO LEVELS OF "ACTUAL HARM"
A.

The Beginning of the Dichotomous Approach

There is reason to believe that courts, prior to the enactment of the
FTDA, were already applying a dichotomous standard approach to
dilution, though never explicitly stating so, and despite statutory
language that appeared to contemplate a single standard was to be
applied to both forms of dilution.' 23 This is best illustrated by the Second
Circuit's opinions in Mead Data and Deere where it interpreted New
York's anti-dilution statute. 124 Though the New York statute expressly
establishes a likelihood-of-harm standard, where the FTDA does not, i25
it appears at least arguable that the court in these two decisions was
applying a more stringent standard to the blurring claim. The legislative
history accompanying the New York statute indicates that the purpose of
the statute was to prevent "'the whittling away of an established trade120. See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 24:104, at 24-221 ("[Tamishment] has had relatively
consistent success when defendant has used plaintiff's mark in an unwholesome or degrading
context."); Oswald, supra note 38, at 271 (The determination of whether a junior mark places a
senior mark in an unwholesome or unsavory light is necessarily heavily fact-dependent. The
subjective evaluations engaged in by courts, whether they are applying state statutes or the federal
Act, work well in this context.); see also id. at 278 (noting that junior user's use of the mark in
question "is more likely to damage the senior user's business reputation (because customers may
mistakenly believe that the senior user promotes or condones illegal drug use) than it is to diminish
the ability of the senior mark to identify and distinguish the senior user's carbonated beverage").
121. Allied Maint. Corp. v. Allied Mech. Trades, Inc., 369 N.E. 2d 1162, 1165 (N.Y. 1977)
(describing dilution in general as a "cancer-like growth of dissimilar products or services which
feeds upon the business reputation of an established distinctive trade-mark or name.").
122. See discussion infra Part V.C. I.
123. See, e.g., Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2d
Cir. 1989) (blurring); Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994) (tarnishing).
124. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 368-d (McKinney 1996) (current version at N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW § 360-1 (McKinney 2003)).
125. This distinction between the state statutes and the FTDA is pointed out by those who
believe an actual harm standard applies under the FTDA. See, e.g., Eric A. Prager, The Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Substantial Likelihood of Confusion, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 121, 130 (1996).
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mark's selling power and value through its unauthorized use by others
upon dissimilar products.' 126 It is not surprising that this purpose is very
similar to that underlying the enactment of the FTDA, since the FTDA
was patterned after the language and enacted for the same purpose, as
127
the state statutes.
In Mead Data,the court was asked to determine whether the use of
the trademark "LEXUS," as used on luxury cars, blurred the distinctive
quality of the trademark "LEXIS," as used in connection with a
computerized legal research service. 128 Though the court concluded that
there was no substantial similarity between the two marks, which would
have been enough to defeat the blurring claim, the court noted that there
were additional factors that mitigated against a finding of blurring. 129 For
instance, the "LEXIS" mark, though well-known within the legal
130
community, had very little selling power outside that limited market.
The court made a point of stating that "it does not follow that every
junior use of a similar mark will dilute the senior mark in the manner
contemplated by the [statute]."' 3' The court could not conceive of a
scenario where the use of the "LEXUS" mark would cause harm to the
"LEXIS" mark, specifically because the "LEXIS" mark "circulate[d]
only in a limited market [making] it ...unlikely to be associated
generally with the mark for a dissimilar product circulating
elsewhere."'

32

Finally, the court took into account that the users of the

service bearing the "LEXIS" mark were highly sophisticated.

33

Based

126. Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1028 (quoting legislative history of N.Y BUS. LAW 368-d)
(citation omitted).
127. See discussion supra Part 111.
128. See Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1027.
129. See id. at 1030. While the majority held that the two marks were not substantially similar
because each sounded different when properly pronounced, Judge Sweet in his concurrence
expressly disagreed. See id. at 1032. This is important because the majority could have ended its
analysis after concluding that the marks were not substantially similar. See id. at 1029. Instead, the
court went on to further analyze the facts of the case and appears to focus on the fact that there does
not appear to be any harm to the owner of the trademark "LEXIS" by the use of the trademark
"LEXUS." See id.
at 1030-32.
130. See id.
at 1031.
131. Id. This statement is equally applicable to both tamishment and blurring, but may be more
relevant to blurring because of the need for the junior user's mark to cause actual harm to the senior
mark, the standard proposed by this Note. This statement is equally applicable to the FTDA and
apparently has been followed, though not explicitly stating so, in Ringling Bros. and Westchester
Media. See discussion infra Part V.B. 1,3.
132. Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1031. As stated in the discussion of Nabisco, infra Part V.B.2,
because both products were very similar and would be advertised and sold nationally, the court
could have been persuaded that there was actual harm and therefore requiring judicial intervention.
133. See Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1031. It is interesting to note that this same court in Nabisco
looked to the sophistication of children, the predominate consumers of the product, and decided that
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on the latter, the court held that it was "unlikely that, even in the market
where [the senior user] principally operates, there will be any significant
amount of blurring between the [two marks].' 34
In Deere, the Second Circuit was confronted with the question of
whether an advertiser's use of an altered form of its competitor's famous
trademark to identify the competitor's product in a comparative
advertisement constituted tarnishment135 After discussing the alterations
the junior user made to the senior user's famous trademark, the court did
not discuss the factors considered by the majority in Mead Data,
particularly, the substantial similarity of the marks in question, the size
of the relevant markets of the respective products, and the sophistication
level of the consumers. 136 Instead, the court held that the Deere
trademark had been tarnished simply because the type of alterations
made to it "risk the possibility that consumers will come to attribute
unfavorable characteristics to137the mark and ultimately associate [it] with
inferior goods and services."'
Though the court initially understood its decision to create a
completely new form of dilution,1 38 in a later case it observed that its
Deere decision is better understood as adopting a broader view of
tarnishment than had been previously recognized. 139 Besides failing to
discuss any of the factors weighed by the majority in Mead Data, the
court did not have, nor did it require, any survey evidence to
demonstrate that a significant percentage of the relevant population
actually viewed the junior user as having a tarnishing effect on the wellknown senior mark. 140 This fact further supports the view that the Deere
court established a lighter burden for proving tarnishment. The
significance of the court's holdings in Mead Data and Deere as it sought

because their sophistication was low there was a greater chance of harm. Once again this fact tends
to show that while Nabisco may state that a likelihood of harm standard is applicable, the court
really did apply a more stringent test. See discussion infra Part V.B.2.
134. MeadData, 875 F.2d at 1032.
135. See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prod., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 1994). The altered form of

the Deere logo was similar to that used by Deere
depicted as a smaller deer, apparently running
defendant's Yard-Man lawn tractor. See id. at 41.
136. See Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1030-31
"LEXIS" mark is used and the sophistication of the
137. Deere, 41 F.3d at 45 (emphasis added).
138.

in its trademark logo except in this case it was
in fear, and being chased by a dog and the
(discussing the limited market in which the
parties using the service bearing the mark).

Seeid. at44.

139. See Honnel Foods Corp., v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996).
140. But cf Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1031 (noting that, while seventy-six percent of attorneys
associated the mark "LEXIS" with the plaintiffs service, only one percent of the general adult
population recognized the mark "LEXIS," half of that percentage being attorneys and accounts).
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to define the "likelihood-of-harm" standard is not fully appreciated until
these decisions are viewed together. The senior user in Mead Data had
to meet a higher burden to prove its mark had been blurred than the
plaintiff in Deere had to in order to prove its tarnishment claim. This
again may be attributable to the court's ability to recognize the severity
of the harm caused by tarnishment.141 Therefore, without ever stating so,
the Second Circuit was applying the dichotomous approach suggested by
this Note, even though it was interpreting a statute contemplating that
the same standard would be applied to either form of dilution.
B. The "Split" Among the Circuits
1. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc. v.
42
Utah Division of Travel Development
In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit was asked to decide whether Ringling Brothers' ("Ringling")
registered trademark, "THE GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH" had been
diluted by use of the phrase "THE GREATEST SNOW ON EARTH" by
the State of Utah to advertise its winter sports program. 143 In 1961,
Ringling obtained federal trademark registration for the mark it had used
since 1872 in connection with its traveling circus. 144 Utah had been
using the "THE GREATEST SNOW ON EARTH" mark consistently
since as early as 1962, and actually received federal trademark
registration for it despite Ringling's opposition to its application. 145
Since there was no dispute either as to the fame of the mark used by
Ringling or its widespread use, 14 6 the court and the parties acknowledged
147
that the only issue to be decided was whether blurring had occurred.
After a thorough analysis of the dilution cause of action and its history,
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court that held
Ringling failed to demonstrate through proof of actual economic harm to
141. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
142. 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999), overruled in part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.,
537 U.S.418, 123 S.Ct. 1115 (2003).
143. Seeid. at451.
144. See id.
145. See id.at 451-52.
146. Ringling performed approximately one thousand shows annually to an estimated twelve
million people in ninety-five cities. More importantly, Ringling's mark was observed by more than
seventy million people each year. The revenues derived from the goods and services bearing or
using the mark exceeded $103 million, and Ringling's spent approximately $19 million on
advertising for the fiscal year ending January, 1997. See id
147. Seeid.at452&n.l.
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the mark's "selling power" that its mark had been blurred by Utah's use
of a similar mark.148 Though the court itself acknowledged that proof of
economic harm to the selling power of a famous mark would be
difficult, it observed that means of proof were available, such as proof of
actual loss of revenues, carefully constructed, and consumer impressions
from which actual harm economic harm could be inferred, as well as
other indirect evidence that might complement the latter two forms of
proof. 149
Despite the Supreme Court's holding in V Secret Catalogue, the
holding in this case would remain unchanged under the dichotomous
approach proposed in this Note, which would require Ringling to satisfy
the higher level of proof of actual harm. Although before it established
its definition of "actual harm," the Fourth Circuit did discuss the
possibility of inferring actual harm from circumstantial evidence, it later
rejected this method as the use of "long leaps of inference" and "judicial
presumption[s to find] future harm." 5 ° Not only did the Fourth Circuit
decline to presume that the junior mark caused economic harm to the
famous mark, but the court further suggested that some junior uses
would not affect the economic value of the senior mark at all, perhaps
because of lack of exposure or general lack of consumer interest in both
marks' products, and that some junior uses might even enhance the value
of a senior mark by drawing renewed attention to it.' 5' While this is
arguably true in some cases, the relevance of those conclusions made by
the court is questionable, given that it could have reached the correct
result even by applying the non-economic definition of "actual harm"
stated in V Secret Catalogue and requiring the higher level of proof of
actual harm proposed by this Note.
It is the opinion of this author that the Fourth Circuit's decision is
best understood as an extension of the majority's reasoning in Mead
Data, that is, the Fourth Circuit appears to be stating the same factors
examined in that Second Circuit decision in its search for some form of
recognizable harm. First, there is little doubt that the Fourth Circuit did
not take into consideration that the two marks at issue had been used
concurrently for well over thirty years.' 52 Second, not only was the use

148. See id. at 451.
149. See id. at 464-65.
150. Id.at 464.
151. See id. at 460.
152. See Stephen W. Feingold et al., Circuits Struggle with Dilution Law's Lack of Clarity,
NAT'L L.J., May 1, 2000, at C8 ("[lit is reasonable for a court to require a showing of actual
dilution when two marks have co-existed for a long time.").
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of the similar mark not novel, the survey evidence introduced by
Ringling negated any chance it had to prove that, in fact, that the two
marks at issue were being blurred in the minds of consumers.'1 3 The
survey showed that zero percent of those surveyed outside of Utah
completed the statement "THE GREATEST [blank] ON EARTH" with
the word "snow" and less than one percent actually completed the
statement with "show" and associated the result with Ringling, while
also completing the statement54 with "snow" and associating the
completed statement with Utah. 1
While the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the lower court's use of the
"Mead Data factors" in connection with a claim under the FTDA, the
lower court's interpretation of the sophistication level of consumers is
relevant to the Fourth Circuit's decision. 5 5 While finding that Ringling's
consumers were generally unsophisticated, a finding that would usually
weigh in favor of finding blurring, 5 6 the lower court had found that
Utah's mark was used in a very limited market and that within that
market, only targeted to highly sophisticated consumers. 57 This is
relevant in finding a lack of blurring because these consumers are part of
the select group that would potentially come into contact with both
marks and therefore, based on its high degree of sophistication, the
existence of blurring would be very unlikely.'5 8 Therefore, it appears
that by simply following the more stringent standard used by the
majority in Mead Data, the court could have arrived at the same
59
conclusion-there was no real potential of harm to Ringling's mark.1
Though this decision was reached before Nabisco, the Fourth
Circuit appears to agree that blurring is a very fact-sensitive claim and
that factors elaborated in one case may be totally inappropriate in

153. The problem was that Ringling's survey was used to prove only an "instinctive mental
association" of the two marks, the only requirement Ringling thought was necessary to prove
blurring. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 462 (internal quotation marks omitted). Ringling's reasoning
was patently wrong even by the standard courts used in interpreting state statutes, which would have
required more evidence of actual harm. See, e.g., Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales,
U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031-32 (2d Cir. 1989).
154. See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 462. The evidence Ringling submitted for those surveyed
in Utah was slightly more favorable to its claim. See id.
155. Seeid. at463-64.
156. See. e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 220-221 (2d Cir. 1999),
overruled in part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 123 S. Ct. 1115(2003).
157. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & BaileyCombined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev.,
955 F. Supp. 605, 621 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff'd, 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999), overruled in part by
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003).
158. See id. at 621-22.
159. See discussion supra Part V.A.
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another. 60 An important distinction between Ringling and Nabisco, in
which blurring was found to exist, is that in Ringling the respective
trademarks were being used on non-competing goods, a factor that
undoubtedly plays an important role.' 6' Also, the Fourth Circuit was not
dealing with two nationally advertised products that could potentially be
sold on the same shelf in the grocery store. While in Ringling, the owner
of the famous mark did not present sufficient evidence of blurring, the
court established an unnecessarily higher burden for an owner of a
famous trademark to meet to satisfy the actual-harm standard, which was
due in part to its concern that creating a lower burden would in effect
grant a property-right-in-gross to a famous mark. 62 That concern was
addressed in Nabisco and the Second Circuit agreed that allowing
blurring to be proven by establishing the substantial similarity of the
marks would in effect award a property-right-in-gross to the famous
mark. 63 Finally, though proof of economic harm is no longer required, it
is important to note the Fourth Circuit's decision would have led to an
undesirable result if it had been adopted as the correct standard, at least
from the viewpoint of an owner of a famous mark who desires to bring a
tarnishing claim. Because the court did not explicitly limit its holding to
blurring, it evidently would have required the same level of proof for
tarnishment where the harm inflicted on the famous mark is readily
recognizable. 64
165

2. Nabisco, Inc. v. PFBrands, Inc.
In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit found that Nabisco's use of orange, bite-sized, cheddar cheeseflavored, goldfish-shaped crackers would dilute the distinctive quality of
Pepperidge Farm's similarly produced crackers.' 66 Nabisco had
contracted with the Nickelodeon Television Network to develop a snack
product based on "CatDog," a popular Nickelodeon children's
160. The court observed that in conjunction with proof of lost revenues and carefully
constructed surveys, there were other relevant factors that might be used as indirect evidence to
complement other proof. See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 465. The need for a case-by-case factual
inquiry into whether blurring has occurred has been recognized by subsequent circuit court
decisions. See, e.g., Times Mirror Magazines Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, 212 F.3d 157, 168-69
(3d Cir. 2000) (quoting district court decision). See also discussion infra Part V.C.2.
161. See discussion infra Part V.C.2.
162. See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 459.
163. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d 208, 226 n.6 (2d Cir. 1999), overruled in part by Moseley v. V
Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003).
164. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
165. 191 F.3d208(2dCir. 1999).
166. Seeid. at212.
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program. 67 About seventy-five percent of the small orange crackers
used by Nabisco were in the shape of the two-headed "CatDog"
character and a bone. 168 Pepperidge Farm was only concerned with the
similarity of the remaining one quarter of the crackers which bore close
resemblance to its famous "GOLDFISH" brand crackers in color, shape,
size and taste, 169 even though the "CatDog" fish was visibly larger and
flatter with markings on one side. 170 After receiving a cease-and-desist
letter, Nabisco filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that its
product did not violate any of Pepperidge Farm's rights in the
"GOLDFISH" trademark.171 Pepperidge Farm counterclaimed, asserting
that Nabisco's use diluted the "GOLDFISH" trademark under the
FTDA.' 72
This case involved only dilution by blurring, rendering it
unnecessary for the Second Circuit to discuss and differentiate harm
caused by tamishment. While Pepperidge Farm originally alleged that it
had to "protect its wholesome, 'family-oriented' product and image from
tarnishment by association with the 'coarse and/or unsavory elements' of
Nickelodeon's CatDog program,'', 73 the district court emphasized
74
skepticism about the possibility that Nabisco's use tarnished its mark.
The Second Circuit, acknowledging that a valid claim for blurring was
presented, stated that Nabisco's production of the "CatDog" crackers
"strikes at the heart of what [anti-] dilution law is intended to prevent:
the 'gradual diminution or whittling away of the value of the famous
mark by blurring uses by others."",175 The district court further reasoned,
and the Second Circuit agreed that "the presence of Nabisco's goldfish-

167. Seeid. at213.
168. See id.
169. In this case, the famous status of Pepperidge Farm's trademarked "Goldfish" design was
not disputed. See id. at 215.
170.
171.
172.

See id. at213.
See id.
See id.

173. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 188, 205 n.26 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd, 191
F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999), overruled in part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418,
123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003).
174. See id (noting that while Pepperidge Farm might cringe at CatDog's depiction of
"'garbage and sewers' or its cartoon violence, these elements of the program do not rise to the
level of tamishment"). Also relevant for the purposes of discussing "tamishment" was the fact that
the district court observed that there was no evidence that Nabisco's use depicted obscene, sexual,
or illegal activities. See id.
175. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 214 (quoting Nabisco, 50 F. Supp. at 209-10) (internal citation
omitted in original).
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shaped cracker within the CatDog mix is likely
to weaken the focus of
' 176
consumers on the true source of the Goldfish."
While the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that
found that Nabisco's use blurred the "GOLDFISH" mark, it did not
agree to its use of the Mead Data factors 177 as a fixed test for claims
brought under the FTDA. 178 Instead, it promulgated a new nonexhaustive list of ten factors, which included such criteria as:
1) distinctiveness of the mark; 2) similarity of the marks; 3) proximity of
the products and likelihood of bridging the gap; 4) interrelationship
among the distinctiveness of the senior mark, the similarity of the junior
mark, and the proximity of the products; 5) shared consumers and
geographic limitations; 6) sophistication of consumers; 7) actual
confusion; 8) adjectival or referential quality of the senior use; 9) harm
to the junior user and delay by the senior user; and 10) effect of senior's
prior laxity in protecting the mark. 179 After balancing these factors, the
court concluded that Pepperidge Farm had demonstrated a sufficient
likelihood of harm to its mark.' 80
Though the Second Circuit's holding would remain unchanged
under the dichotomous approach proposed by this Note, characterizing
the Second Circuit's analysis as a "likelihood-of-harm" standard in
Nabisco was inaccurate. Designating that it was applying a "likelihoodof-harm" standard may have resulted from its disagreement with the
Fourth Circuit's characterization of what constituted "actual harm"
under the FTDA. 18 ' The court disagreed with the Fourth Circuit's
requirement that actual harm be shown through evidence of actual loss
of revenues or the carefully constructed consumer survey.18 2 These
requirements were considered "an arbitrary and unwarranted limitation
on the methods of proof."' 183 The court also disagreed with the broader

176. Id.
177. The "Mead Data factors" are not the factors relied upon by the majority, but were
promulgated by Judge Sweet in his concurrence, and so were not technically followed in Mead

Data. These factors are the similarity of the marks; similarity of the products covered by the marks;
sophistication of consumers; predatory intent; renown of the senior mark; and the renown of the
junior mark. See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1035
(2d Cir. 1989) (Sweet, J., concurring).
178. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 227.
179.

See id.at 217-22.

180. See id. at 222-23.
181. See discussion supra Part V.B.1.
182. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224. The Nabisco court characterized this as the narrow position
adopted by the Fourth Circuit in requiring actual dilution. See id.
183. Id. at 223. The court also observed that even if diminished revenues could be proven, "it
would be extraordinarily speculative and difficult to prove that the loss was due to the dilution of
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interpretation of the Fourth Circuit's decision, which would have
required the same forms of evidence of actual harm, but would have
required that 4the junior user be already currently operating in the
8
marketplace. 1
According to the Second Circuit, the Fourth Circuit's interpretation
of the FTDA would subject the owner of a famous mark to an injury that
had no remedy because, while the FTDA could only be invoked when
the senior mark suffered harm, it would only provide the senior user
with injunctive relief since damages were not obtainable absent
willfulness.185 The court reasoned that interpreting the FTDA in that
manner would be harmful to the junior user because it would be
prevented from seeking declaratory relief and would be forced to invest
in advertising and product promotion without knowing if it will be
86
permitted to use its mark.
Now that it has been decided that the Fourth Circuit's definition of
what constitutes "actual harm" is not the law, the Second Circuit's
concerns with that decision can be discarded. Once that is done, it is
clear that, in deciding Nabisco, the Second Circuit did employ an actualharm standard, and that Pepperidge Farm was able to satisfy the higher
level of proof as required by the proposition set forth in this Note. The
Second Circuit appropriately began its analysis by observing that:
[In the future, courts] considering [this] new federal statutory right ...
would do better to feel their way from case to case, setting forth in
each those factors that seem to bear on the resolution of that case, and
only eventually to arrive
of relevant factors on the basis
- at
• a consensus
187
of this accumulated experience.
This statement acknowledges that blurring cases are very fact-sensitive
and need to be decided based on those facts, and not a rigid set of
factors. 88 Some factors the court took into consideration resemble those
relied upon by the majority in Mead Data, in that court's search for
evidence of harm to the senior mark.

the mark[, a]nd ...[that] consumer surveys [were] expensive, time-consuming and not immune to
manipulation." Id. at 224.
184. See id. This sound reasoning by the court was acknowledged when Congress later
amended the Lanham Act to allow owners of famous marks to intervene in trademark registration
proceedings by filing a notice of opposition with the Patent and Trademark Office based on the
belief that the mark would cause dilution. See 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a) (Supp. V 2000).
185. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224.
186. See id.
187. Id. at 227.
188. See id.
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First, the Second Circuit looked to the sophistication of the
consumers purchasing the products-that is, the adults, and not the
children to whom the marketing of the products is directed. 189 The court
reasoned that adults purchasing these products would be less
sophisticated in recognizing the differences between the two types of
fish-shaped crackers, let alone have an awareness of Nickelodeon's
CatDog.190 Second, the court noted that the two products would be direct
competitors and in fact, were substitutes for each other.1 9' Third, these
products were not sold in limited markets, but would be nationally
advertised and sold in grocery stores throughout the world. 19 2 This
evidence, including the characterization of Pepperidge Farm's mark as
arbitrary, 193 was sufficient to prove the necessary level of actual harm as
that proposition is set forth in this Note. For that reason, it is more likely
that the court was continuing to apply the same analysis it did in Mead
Data, except that this time 94there was sufficient evidence to pass the more
stringent test for blurring.'
95
3. Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc. 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed
the question of whether the use of the "POLO" mark, which had become
famous in connection with the merchandise sold by Ralph Lauren, had
196
been blurred by the use of that same mark on an equestrian magazine.
Ralph Lauren has built his multi-billion dollar fashion empire ("PRL")
with the help of his famous "POLO" trademark1 97 used on various
merchandise from men's apparel to bed sheets. 198 PRL originally alleged

189. See id. at 220-21.
190. See id.; cf Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026,
1031-32 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting the high level of sophistication of the users of service bearing the
"LEXIS" mark would preclude any significant amount of blurring).
191. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 220.
192. See id. ("If the consumers who buy the products of the senior user never see the junior
user's products or publicity, then those consumers will continue to perceive the senior user's mark
as unique, notwithstanding the junior use."); cf Mead Data,875 F.2d at 1031 (noting that "LEXIS"
mark circulated only in a limited market and was unlikely to be associated with a mark on a
dissimilar product marketed to different consumers).
193. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 218 ("In sum, because the use of the goldfish shape has no
logical relationship to a bite-sized cheese cracker ... we believe that Pepperidge Farm's senior
mark is reasonably distinctive."). Marks that are classified as arbitrary are inherently distinctive,
thus entitling them to a greater degree of protection. See discussion supra Part II.B.
194. See discussion supraPart V.A.
195. 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000).
196. See id. at 669.
197. Westchester Media did not contest the mark's famous status. See id. at 670.
198. See id.
at 661.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2003

29

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 4 [2003], Art. 12

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:1213

that the use of "POLO" on the magazine both blurred and tarnished its
"POLO" mark, but the district court observed that "[t]he crux of PRL's
argument is that its mark is diluted by a blurring of identification
between its goods and the one currently produced by [the junior
user]."' 199 The district court appeared to be well aware of the distinction
between the two separate harms and actually observed that the
application of the Mead Data factors tended to favor PRL, yet it did not
elaborate on that conclusion. z° In the end, the district court declined to
rule on PRL's dilution claim after finding infringement. 0 1
Despite the district court's reluctance, the Fifth Circuit decided the
merits of the dilution claim anyway because of its potential to afford
owners of famous trademarks a distinct basis of equitable relief.20 2 As
the issue of the applicable standard of harm to be applied in dilution
cases was one of first impression, the Fifth Circuit decided to adopt the
actual-economic-harm standard promulgated by the Fourth Circuit in
Ringling because that "standard best accords with the plain meaning of
the statute., 20 3 This case is distinguishable from all other United States
Circuit Court dilution cases in that the court found trademark
infringement.2 °4 While the court's holding would be unaffected by
applying the dichotomous approach, its adoption of Ringling's high
standard of proof to establish actial harm is flawed for the same reasons
it was in that case. 20 5 As in Ringling, the Fifth Circuit could have
evaluated the relevant blurring factors and reached the same conclusion,
i.e., that there was no presence of or potential for actual harm.
If the Fifth Circuit in this case had weighed the same relevant
factors used by the majority in Mead Data, it would nonetheless have
found a lack of a sufficient level proof of actual harm to the PRL's
"POLO" mark. First, PRL provided no conclusive survey evidence that
tended to prove its mark was blurred.20 6 Second, it is arguable that the
purchasers of both products bearing the "POLO" mark had a high
sophistication level. Consumers purchasing the magazine may be more
199. Westchester Media Co. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 935, 978 (S.D. Tex.
1999), aff'd in part and vacated and remanded in part, 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000).
200. Seeid.at981.
201. See id. at 980 (deciding not to reach the dilution claim because the court was "reluctant to
enter this uncharted water" given the lack of a governing standard of relief (actual harm v.
likelihood of harm) in the Fifth Circuit and because the relief requested by PRL's in both causes of
actions were the same).
202. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 669.
203. Id. at 670.
204. See id. at 668.
205. See discussion supra Part V.B. 1.
206. See Westchester Media, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 978.
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sophisticated given the exclusivity of the sport of polo and the fact that
there are very few magazines devoted to it. 20 7 The sophistication level of
consumers purchasing merchandise bearing the "POLO" marks also
tends to be high, given the pricing structure of that merchandise and the
propensity of others to produce so-called knock-offs.2 °8 Third, though
the producers of the magazine and PRL market and distribute their
respective products nationally, they undoubtedly operate in a limited
market for the same reasons stated for the high sophistication levels of
the relevant consumers, i.e., the
exclusivity of the sport and the price of
20 9
"POLO" brand merchandise.
Additionally, the marks in this case had been used concurrently for
many years, a fact relevant in Ringling,2 10 and there was also a
continuing relationship between the magazine and PRL before a formal
objection was made by PRL.21 Another factor that weighed against a
finding of "blurring" was the character of the "POLO" mark itself. This
mark would be classified as arbitrary when used as a source indicator of
merchandise.2 12 In most cases, that would mean that it is entitled to a
greater degree of protection, but that reasoning is offset for a number of
reasons. The "POLO" mark, though properly classified as arbitrary when
used on PRL's merchandise, is not so when used on this specific
magazine.21 3 The word "polo" was first used as the name of the sport
before it was ever adopted by PRL as its trademark, but PRL was
attempting to own it for all uses, which is undoubtedly an undesirable
result by all accounts,21 4 presenting an interesting issue unique in
blurring cases decided under the FTDA thus far. If the court held that
dilution by blurring was present, there was significant potential for a
violation of Westchester Media's First Amendment rights.215
207.

See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 674.

208.

See id.

209. See Westchester Media, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 955-56.
210.

See discussion supra Part V.B. 1.

211. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 661-63.
212. There is no logical connection between the mark POLO and items of clothing. See
discussion supraPart I.B.
213. Given that the magazine originally covered the subject of equestrian sports and lifestyles,
and arguably continued to do so even after the change in ownership, the mark properly describes the
contents of the magazine and therefore should be designated as descriptive for trademark purposes.

See discussion supra Part I.B.
214.

See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 673 (stating that:

PRL products became famous by basking in the reflected glow of an elegant sport. PRL
now asserts that it, not the sport, is the source of the glow .... [W]e cannot be blind ...
to the fact that PRL is arrogating the very name of a sport ... [and, iun a sense ... biting

the hand that fed it.).
215. See id. at 664-65.
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The court was able to avoid the First Amendment issue on the
infringement claim by directing the lower court, on remand, to consider
requiring Westchester Media to attach a disclaimer to its magazine.2 16
Although the disclaimer might have served the purpose of alleviating
any consumer confusion as to PRL's affiliation or sponsorship of the
magazine, it would not have provided an adequate remedy for blurring
since that sort of protection does nothing to protect the distinctiveness of
the mark. Finally, given the distinct factual nature of this case and that
found in Ringling, it is not surprising that these courts decided that such
a high level of proof of actual harm was necessary, even though as
suggested by this Note the level of proof of actual harm required is
unnecessary. 1 7
2 18
4. V Secret Catalogue,Inc. v. Moseley
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had to
decide whether V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 219 the owner of the federally
registered trademark "VICTORIA'S SECRET," had established a valid
claim for both blurring and tarnishing against Victor and Cathy Moseley,
owners of a "mom and pop" adult novelty store in a small strip mall in
Elizabethtown, Kentucky,22 ° called "VICTOR'S LITTLE SECRET. 22'
Though the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's decision based
on lack of sufficient evidence of the Court's definition of "actual harm,"
it is important to recount the facts and proceedings below since it is the
opinion of this author that the owner of the famous trademark will
succeed on remand with its tarnishing claim by being able to satisfy the
lower level of proof of actual harm required by the proposition set forth
in this Note.
As with most FTDA claims heard by the circuit courts, there was
no issue as to the famous status of the senior mark, "VICTORIA'S

216. Seeid. at675.
217.
218.

See discussion infra Part V.C.2.
259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001), rev'd and remanded, 537 U.S. 418, 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003).

219. V Secret Catalogue, Incorporated is the owner of the federally registered trademark
"VICTORIA'S SECRET," which it then licenses the use of to plaintiffs Victoria's Secret Catalogue,

LLC and Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc. See VSec-et Catalogue, 259 F.3d at 466.
220.

See id.

221. The Moseleys' original name for the store was "Victor's Secret" and changed it to
"Victor's Little Secret," after receiving a cease and desist letter from Victoria's Secret. After finding
this change to be unsatisfactory, Victoria's Secret commenced an action in the district court. See id.
at 466-67. The Sixth Circuit, agreeing with the district court, noted that the alteration was minor
since the word "Little" was substantially smaller and its placement above "Victor's Secret" made it
appear as an obvious afterthought. See id. at 476-77.
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1245

222
SECRET.,
The district court, with very little discussion of its
reasoning, found that the Moseleys' use both blurred and tarnished the
"VICTORIA'S SECRET" mark.223 The Sixth Circuit, after analyzing the
decisions in Ringling and Nabisco, 224 adopted and applied the
"likelihood-of-harm" standard in affirming the district court's holding.22 5
The court reasoned that while consumers would not go to the Moseleys'
store looking for products known to be made by Victoria's Secret,
"consumers who hear the name 'Victor's Little Secret' are likely
automatically to think of the more famous store and link it to the
Moseleys' adult-toy, gag gift, and lingerie shop. 226 Therefore, the court
stated that the facts of this case presented a classic example of dilution
caused by tarnishing (associating the Victoria's Secret name with sex
toys and lewd coffee mugs) and by blurring (linking the chain with a
single, unauthorized establishment).2 27
Instead of seizing an opportunity to formulate a framework for
determining the level of harm necessary for each form of dilution, given
that the facts of this case presented potentially valid claims of both
blurring and tarnishing, 228 the Sixth Circuit simply adopted the standard
used by Nabisco and the list of ten factors that court used to determine
dilution, though it did not discuss the factors individually in holding that
the "VICTORIA SECRET" mark had been diluted. 229 Although the
court's holding, enjoining the use of the Moseleys'mark, would remain
unchanged under the dichotomous approach, the court was only correct
in issuing an injunction because of the tarnishing effect the Moseleys'
mark has on the "VICTORIA'S SECRET" mark, since the argument that
blurring was present was not substantiated by the level of proof
presented by the owner of the famous mark. While the Sixth Circuit
stated that the facts presented a classic example of dilution by blurring
(linking the chain with a single, unauthorized establishment), it would
have been more accurate to classify this as a potentially valid claim of

222.

See id. at 467. There are over 750 Victoria Secret stores throughout the world and over

four hundred million of the store's catalogues are distributed each year, thirty-nine thousand of
which were distributed in Elizabethtown, Kentucky. The court also noted a recent consumer survey
that rated Victoria's Secret as the ninth most famous brand in the apparel industry. See id. at 466.

223. See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, No. 3:98CV-395-S, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5215, at * 14-16 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 9, 2000), aft'd, 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001), rev'd and remanded,
537 U.S. 418, 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003).
224. See VSecret Catalogue, 259 F.3d at 475-77.
225.

See id. at 477.

226. Id.
227. See id.
228. See Recent Cases, supra note 11l,
at 731.
229. See VSecret Catalogue, 259 F.3d at 475-76.
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blurring. If the court would have discussed some of the more important
factors set out in Nabisco, it is possible that it would have had a difficult
time finding the presence of the necessary level of actual harm to
establish blurring. The Sixth Circuit, at least as it pertains to the blurring
claim, appeared to presume that mental association alone was enough to
establish dilution, but that was never a presumption made in any other
dilution case heard by the circuit courts, and now
that presumption has
230
been expressly rejected by the Supreme Court.
By simply analyzing just a few of the relevant blurring factors, the
Sixth Circuit could have decided that blurring was not present on the
facts of this case. Specifically, the court did agree with the district
court's characterization that the sophistication level of consumer
shopping at Victoria's Secret was high. 231 The high sophistication level
combined with the fact that the "VICTORIA'S SECRET" mark is
usually found in upscale malls and is marketed on a national level, while
in reality it caters to a slightly more limited market given the expensive
nature of the merchandise, tends to negate the finding of blurring when
viewed with facts about the mark adopted by the Moseleys.232 The
Moseleys use their mark on a store that is located in a strip mall in a
small town in Kentucky that also advertises the sale of pagers in their
storefront window.2 33 In addition, their mark would have very little
selling power outside the small Kentucky town in which they operate
their store considering the Moseleys did not intend to expand beyond
their current location.234 Thus, the foregoing translates to a negligible
amount of direct competition and most importantly few, if any,
consumers being exposed to both marks outside this limited area, a fact
relevant in35most cases where blurring was not found to exist, including
2
Ringling.
Turning to the tarnishing claim, it is conceivable that to the Sixth
Circuit the tarnishing was so apparent that it relied predominantly on
that claim in its decision to enjoin the further use of the Moseleys'

230. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 (2003).
231. See VSecret Catalogue, 259 F.3d at 477.
232. See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, No. 3:98CV-395-S, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5215, at * 8-10 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 9, 2000), affd, 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001), rev'd and remanded,
537 U.S. 418, 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003).
233. See id. at *8.
234. See id. at * 11.

235. See discussion supra Part V.B.I.
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mark.236 Indeed, it is important to note that Victoria's Secret, Inc. had
been informed of Moseleys' use of the mark by a letter wherein the
writer expressed some concern over the use of the mark by the Moseleys
and actually declared that he was "'personally offended by [their] use of
a bona fide, reputable company's trademark to promote [their]
unwholesome, tawdry merchandise.' ' 237 This is significant for two
reasons. First, it tends to show how quickly a consumer can become
offended as a result of a tarnishing use of a famous trademark. Second, it
shows that blurring, while it may be present, is not always readily
identifiable by consumers, especially as in238this situation, where the
junior mark is used in such a limited market.
The Supreme Court did state that tarnishing is not a necessary
consequence of mental association, 239 but that statement, while
completely accurate for blurring, does not appear to be as strong in light
of the fact that someone was offended enough by the Moseleys' use of a
similar mark to write a letter expressing that feeling after making that
mental association. The Supreme Court further noted that the writer of
that letter did not form any different impression of Victoria's Secret, and
that while offended by the use of the name "VICTOR'S SECRET" (the
name of the Moseleys' store at the time he wrote the letter), his offense
was directed at the Moseleys, not Victoria's Secret. 240 But the latter does
not change the fact the writer of the letter was offended, apparently
because he felt that the Moseleys' mark was used in a way that was
grossly inconsistent with the famous mark's image. It should be noted
that the writer of that letter was Colonel John Baker, Staff Judge
Advocate for the U.S. Army Center, and is arguably more sophisticated
24
than the general public, at least within the realm of legal matters. 1
While this Note makes a point of stating that the sophistication level of
consumers is not a necessary factor to be considered in adjudicating
tarnishing claims, it can be relevant. 242 It might be better to view Colonel
Baker's letter as a warning to Victoria's Secret, wherein he advises them
236. As previously stated, claims for tamishment have had greater success because of the
ability of the court to observe the potential harm to the senior user without much difficulty. See
discussion supra Part IV.B.
237. Brief for Respondents at 4, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 123 S.Ct.
1115 (2003) (No. 01-1015) (second alteration in original).
238. It would be a different scenario if the letter sent to Victoria's Secret had contained another
line stating that there was some concern that the Victoria's Secret mark would start to lose its
distinctive quality if Victoria's Secret did not take action to protect its mark.
239. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 123 S.Ct. 1115, 1125 (2003).
240. See id.
241. See Brief for Respondents at 5, V Secret Catalogue(No. 01-1015).
242. See discussion infra Part V.C.I.
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that while he knows that Victoria's Secret, Inc. has nothing to do with
the Moseley's store or choice of name, other less sophisticated
individuals may attribute the Moseley's use of their mark to Victoria's
Secret.
Compare the above situation with NBA Propertiesv. Untertainment
Records, LLC, 243 where the junior user's mark, used in advertisement to
promote a rap album, altered the famous National Basketball
Association's ("NBA") trademark, which depicts a basketball player
dribbling a basketball with his left hand, by placing "a gun in [the right]
hand alongside the words 'SDE
SPORTS,
DRUGS, &
ENTERTAINMENT.' ' 244 In that case, the NBA commenced a lawsuit
soon after receiving calls from distressed residents and representatives of
school, community and church groups who all expressed their outrage at
what they thought was the NBA's sponsorship of such a use of the
NBA's trademark.24 5 Surely in that situation, where the consumers have
made the mental association between the two marks and have followed
that by attributing the unsavory characteristics of the junior mark to the
famous mark, there is sufficient proof of "actual harm" caused by
tarnishing. Therefore, on remand, if Victoria's Secret can present any
evidence of individuals directing their displeasure entirely at them,
including relevant survey evidence, the Moseleys should be enjoined
from further use of their mark.
In conclusion, these types of cases do pose a special challenge to
application of the dichotomous level of harm approach, as the facts
present potentially valid claims for both blurring and tarnishing.
Applying the standard proposed by this Note in such cases, satisfying
the lower level of proof of the "actual harm" standard would not be
insufficient to prevent any use of the diluting mark by the junior user
later. In other words, if the junior user discontinued the use of the mark
that caused tarnishing, but arguably still caused blurring, the owner of
the famous mark should have to satisfy the higher level of proof of
actual harm.246 For this reason, the owner of a famous trademark, in
cases involving both forms of dilution, should try to prove the higher
level of "actual harm" the first time as to avoid further litigation. For
243. 99 CIV. 2933 (HB), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7780 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 1999).
244. Id. at *2.
245.

See id. at *5.

246. Using V Secret Catalogue as an example, if the Moseley's had discontinued selling those
adult products, which Victoria's Secret claimed tarnished its mark, and continued selling only those
products "acceptable" to Victoria's Secret, the only possible form of dilution present would be
blurring. Therefore, Victoria's Secret would need to prove actual harm to its mark to enjoin
Moseley's use of"Victor's Little Secret." See discussion supra Part V.B.4.
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illustrative purposes, if the Moseleys had ceased the sale of the
"offending" goods, leaving just the lingerie, Victoria's Secret would
have to prove the higher level of actual harm according to the
proposition set forth in this Note.247
C. A Rational Proposal
Despite the inconsistency in the application of the FTDA, the fact
that it was meant to serve as a remedy for both blurring and tarnishing is
a settled matter.248 Therefore, because courts will continue to recognize
both blurring and tarnishing, it is important that courts interpret the
FTDA in light of these two forms of dilution.249 Courts should begin by
interpreting the phrase "causes dilution" by replacing "dilution" with the
specific form of harm presented. 250 Then, the court can proceed with its
analysis to determine whether on the facts presented the junior users
mark "causes tarnishment," "causes blurring," or both. This
interpretation of the phrase "causes dilution" will make it easier for
courts to recognize the inherent differences between the two forms of
dilution, particularly the point at which the harm occurs and its rate of
speed, thus necessitating this dichotomous level of proof-of-actual-harm
approach.
247. See discussion infra Part V.C.2.
248. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 192 F. Supp. 2d 790, 797 (W.D. Tenn.
2001) (noting that while typical antidilution statutes proscribe 'dilution' in general, without
distinguishing between blurring and tarnishing in their statutory language, courts have nonetheless
consistently held that these statutes encompass both within their reach). But see V Secret Catalogue,
Inc., v. Moseley, 537 U.S. 418, 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1124 (2003) ("Whether [tamishment] is actually
embraced by the [FTDA] ... is another matter.").
249. See Oswald, supranote 38, at 279.
[T]hese arguments seem to center on the manner in which such actions should be
brought (e.g., as the common law tort of injury to business and not under the statutory
cause of action for dilution), and do not suggest that the underlying behavior should go
unremedied. Given that dilution by tamishment is entrenched firmly as a part of
trademark jurisprudence and consistently has been accepted by the courts as a cause of
action under the [FTDA], as well as by state statutes, the question in the context of the
[FTDA] becomes merely the pragmatic one of whether the courts' interpretation of
tarnishment under the [FTDA] is correct.
Id.(footnote omitted).
250. This proposal should refute another argument made by courts and commentators that there
should be a different interpretation of the FTDA from that of the state statutes that use the phrase
"likelihood of dilution." See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div.
of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 461 (4th Cir. 1999), overruled in part by Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003); Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The
Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection,58 U. PITT L. REV. 789, 840 (1997)
("In place of the 'likelihood of dilution' language of the state antidilution statutes, the [FTDA] thus
creates an actual dilution requirement .... ").
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This proposal also takes into consideration that the FTDA requires
only a "lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and
distinguish goods or services"' 25' and since the word "capacity" connotes
an ability to dilute, no actual dilution in the marketplace is necessary. 252
In Justice Kennedy's concurrence, in V Secret Catalogue, he wrote
separately from the Court to mention that
[C]onsiderable attention should be given.., to the word 'capacity' ...
[because it] imports into the dilution inquiry both the present and the
potential power of the famous mark to identify and distinguish goods,
and [that] in some cases the 2fact
that this power will be diminished
53
could suffice to show dilution.
Finally, this proposal takes into account that the only relief afforded
by the FTDA, absent willfulness, is injunctive relief. Again, Justice
Kennedy appropriately highlighted this fact when he noted, "[e]quity
principles encourage those who are injured to assert their rights
promptly. A holder of a famous mark threatened with diminishment of
the mark's capacity to serve its purpose should not be forced to wait
until the 25damage
is done and the distinctiveness of the mark has been
4
eroded.,
1. The Lower Level of Proof of Actual Harm for Tarnishment
The injury inflicted on a famous mark by tarnishment is immediate
and therefore makes it essential that a court demand only the lower level
of proof of actual harm. Proposing that tarnishment requires only such
level of proof to enjoin the use of a mark that tarnishes is based in part
on arguments made by some commentators that tarnishment, which has
a likelihood-of-confusion aspect, should not be considered a form of
dilution. 255 This argument is not without merit since by definition for a
famous mark to be tarnished it is necessary for consumers to make the
251.

15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. V 2000).

252. See Courtland L. Reichman, State and Federal Trademark Dilution, 17 FRANCHISE L.J.
11, 132 (1998); MCCARTHY, supra note 18, 24:94 at 24-181 ("[T]he [FTDA] does not require
proof of an actual lessening of the strength of the famous mark: only that there is a lessening of the
capacity or the ability of the mark to be strong as a commercial symbol and identifier.").
253. VSecret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 123 S. Ct. at 1125 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
254. Id.
255. See generally Nelson, supra note 73 (arguing that because tamishment is analyzed and
applied by courts according to the principle of likelihood of confusion its proper position in the law
of unfair competition is not under trademark dilution); see also Beverly W. Pattishall, Dawning
Acceptance of the Dilution Rationale for Trademark-Trade Identity Protection, 74 TRADEMARK

REP. 289, 307 (1984) ("[A]ny genuine affinity, legal or logical, between the dilution concept and
[tamishment] seems doubtful.").
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mental association and then link the use by the junior user to the senior
user. 2 16 As the argument goes, "[t]his link allows consumers to channel a
tarnishing mark's bad reputation over to the senior user [and] ...is
257 which
essentially the same as that effecting a likelihood of confusion,"
258
action.
is the essential element of a trademark infringement
While that argument tends to focus more on the general concept of
dilution rather than on the specific wording of any statute, another
argument has been made that while state anti-dilution statutes may have
provided a remedy for the type of harm caused by tamishment, the
FTDA does not,2 59 which again was also implied by the Supreme Court

in V Secret Catalogue.260 While it is true that many state statues did
include the wording "likelihood of injury to business reputation, 261 that
argument fails for two reasons. First, it is not certain whether the phrase
"likelihood of injury to business reputation" is the foundation of the
tarnishment theory.262 Second, and perhaps more importantly, that
argument fails to recognize that the legislative history makes it
abundantly clear that the FTDA was enacted for the purpose of
preventing both forms of dilution.26 3 Therefore, because "tarnishment is

256. See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 24:70, at 24-123. (for dilution to occur, the relevant
public must make some connection between the mark and both parties).
257. Nelson, supranote 73, at 163.
258. See Oswald, supranote 38, at 259 ("'[L]ikelihood of confusion' is the key [element] to an
infringement claim.").
259. See Robert C. Denicola, Some Thoughts on the Dynamics of Federal Trademark
Legislation and the Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 88-90 (1996)
("Unlike broader state dilution acts with their references to 'injury to business reputation' as well as
to 'dilution of the distinctive quality of a trademark,' the federal dilution statute is limited to uses
that blur the source significance of the mark.") (footnote omitted).
260. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 123 S.Ct. 1115, 1124 (2003).
261. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 368-d (McKinney 1996) (current version at N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAW § 360-1 (McKinney 2003):
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a
mark or trade name shall be a ground for injunctive relief in cases of infringement of a
mark registered or not registered or in cases of unfair competition, notwithstanding the
absence of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source
of goods or services.
Id.
262. See Lisa M. Brownlee, Mead Data Central v. Toyota and Other Contemporary Dilution
Cases: High Noon for Trademark Law's Misfit Doctrine?, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 471, 477 (1989).
While it is possible that the tamishment concept of dilution arose out of the language of
the model statute that provided a separate remedy for 'likelihood of injury to business
reputation,' such distinction has generally not been made. As has been argued, the injury
to business reputation is simply that injury which occurs when a mark is diluted.
Id.
(footnote omitted).
263. See 141 CONG. REC. H 14,317 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (" [T]his bill [HR 1295] is
designed to protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the
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not readily amenable to any other type of analysis in the absence of a
wholesale revision of the doctrine by either the courts or the
legislature-either of which appear at all willing to engage in such an
undertaking,, 264 the focus and attention should not be on taking
tarnishment out of dilution and finding a place for it in the general field
of unfair competition, but rather on finding a solution under the current
framework of dilution.
The first argument for removing the tarnishment claim out of the
dilution cause of action, which is that tarnishment has a likelihood-ofconfusion aspect, supports the use of a lower level of proof of actual
harm. The "confusion" fostered by tarnishing is similar to the type found
in trademark infringement claims in that both cause an "immediate
injury. 265 Therefore, the statement that the dilution theory begins where
the likelihood-of-confusion test leaves off may be true for blurring, but
is not true for tarnishment.266 If infringement protects the consumer from
deception, and blurring protects the value of the trademark to the
trademark holder, it would not be a stretch to state that the protection
from tarnishing meets these two claims somewhere in the middle.267
With trademark infringement the owner is concerned that competitors
may be trying to pass off their products for his and that in turn
268
consumers would be induced to purchase his competitor's products.
The owner of a trademark is also concerned that if a confused consumer
has an unpleasant experience with those other products, they will
attribute this to his own mark.269 With tarnishment, the owner of the
mark is concerned with consumers attributing the unsavory use or any
other inconsistent use of the junior mark to his company.27 ° In that
context, the injury caused by tarnishment does not differ materially from
that arising out of confusion of source or sponsorship.2 71

mark or tarnish or disparage it, even in the absence of a likelihood of confusion.") (statement of
Rep. Moorhead) (emphasis added).
264. Oswald, supra note 38, at 279-80.
265. H.R. REP No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030. See also
discussion supra Part IV.B.

266. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 18 § 24:70 (discussing the difference between
dilution and likelihood of confusion).
267. See Brownlee, supra note 262, at 477 ("[T]amishment not only blurs a mark's

distinctiveness, but can also mar a mark's positive associational value.").
268. See discussion supra Part lI.B.
269. See id
270. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
271. See CALLMANN, supra note 29, § 21.1 1, at 34 (noting that both dilution by tamishment
and dilution by blurring exist, but then stating that the injury caused by dilution, without separating
the two forms, differs materially from that arising out of confusion of source or sponsorship).
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The risk of harm caused by tarnishing necessitates the lower level
of proof of actual harm.2 72 The harm includes not only the possible
alienation by the relevant public, but could also jeopardize the business
relationships the owner of a famous mark has with other companies,
because those other companies could become reluctant to be affiliated
with a mark that has come under suspicion. 273 The owner of a famous
mark also risks the possibility that the public will not identify its mark
with "a product or service of a type incompatible with the quality and
prestige previously attached by the public to the [famous mark]. 274
Therefore, requiring the same level of actual harm for tarnishment
claims as for blurring claims is not only inappropriate for these reasons
stated above, but will also fail to compensate the owner of the famous
mark for the permanent injury already sustained.275 If a mark has been
diluted by tarnishing to the point of economic injury, a court cannot
simply enjoin the consumers who now have a distasteful association
with the mark to alter that association.2 76 Accordingly, the only
appropriate solution to avoid this undesirable result from the beginning
is for a court to enjoin the tarnishing use at the very outset.27 7 Hence,
while tarnishment and infringement may each take its own separate and
distinct path, they both end up at the same unfortunate destination-the
land of lost revenues and harmed reputations-and therefore the lower
level of proof of actual harm for tarnishing is required.
Before specifying the factors that should be considered by a court
when determining whether actual harm caused by tarnishment exists, it

272. See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[T]he risk
may be that of detracting from the plaintiff's good will by the possibility that a defendant's use of
plaintiff's unique mark will tarnish plaintiffs trade name by reason of public dissatisfaction with

defendant's product and a resultant holding of this dissatisfaction against plaintiff.") (citing Tiffany
& Co. v. Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836, 844 (D.Mass. 1964)) (alteration in original); see also
NBA Props. v. Untertainment Records, LLC, 99 Civ. 2933 (HB), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7780, *5
(S.D.N.Y. May 25, 1999) (noting that the NBA commenced the lawsuit soon after receiving calls
from distressed residents and representatives of school, community, and church groups expressing
outrage at what they thought was the sponsorship of the tarnishing use of the famous mark by the
NBA).
273. See, e.g., NBA Props., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7780, at *23.
274. L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 31 (citing Tiffany & Co., 231 F. Supp. at 844); see also NBA
Props., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7780, at *22 (agreeing with the senior user that the junior user's use
of its mark linked the famous mark with violence and drugs and therefore adversely colored the

public's impression of the owner of the famous mark). "The NBA is bound to suffer negative
associations from the juxtaposition of the distorted NBA logo containing the basketball player with

a gun in his right hand and the words 'SPORTS, DRUGS, & ENTERTAINMENT."' Id. at *22-23.
275. See NBA Props., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7780, at *21-22.
276.
277.

See L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 31.
See id.
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should be noted that the protection afforded to famous trademarks by the
FTDA does not go so far as to chill the free expression of speech. It is
still possible that a junior use of a famous mark, which would ordinarily
constitute tarnishment if used in a commercial setting in connection with
the sale of a good or service, will be exempted if it constitutes fair use,278
is used in a noncommercial setting,27 9 including a parody,28 ° or is used in
news reporting or commentary. 281, Therefore, the only junior uses that
will be enjoined, even by satisfying this lower level of proof of actual
harm, will be those uses that tarnish the image of the famous mark where
the junior user is seeking to profit commercially from the connection it
hopes consumers make between its mark and the famous mark.2 82
The question remains: What factors should, the court take into
consideration when adjudicating a tarnishing claim? When considering
the answer to this specific question, the rejection by some courts, as
being improper in assessing a claim under the FTDA, of the use of those
factors considered by the majority in Mead Data, the factors known as
the "Mead Data factors," and some of the Nabisco factors becomes more
appropriate.283 The courts' criticism that some factors, such as the level
of consumer sophistication or the size of the market, have very little
relevance when discussing dilution under the FTDA, while not
completely accurate for blurring, is well taken when discussing the
existence of tarnishment.
The size of the market in which the junior mark is being used and
the sophistication of the consumers are less important factors, though not
completely irrelevant, with tarnishing because the creation of a "tawdry
association" between the senior mark and junior mark occurs
immediately.284 This is because a consumer, like the courts, can easily

278. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(A) (Supp. V 2000).
279. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B).
280. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 898-909 (9th Cir. 2002)
(Kozinski, J.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 993 (2003).
281. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(C).
282. If the same alterations to the NBA's trademark had been made to comment on the current
status of the NBA, specifically those current and former players whose problems have been
spotlighted in the media, there is a much stronger case for allowing its use, than where it is being
used to advertise and promote a rap album, which were the facts of that case.
283. See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Bamum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 463-64 (4th Cir. 1999), overruled in part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue,
Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456,
468-69 (7th Cir. 2000).
284. See id. at 31-32.
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observe the harm caused by tarnishment. 285 The foregoing can be best
exemplified by departing from the facts of V Secret Catalogue.Though
the junior user is using the mark in a small market and the consumers are
arguably sophisticated,286 both factors that may decrease dilution by
blurring, nothing would stop a consumer from telling a friend in another
part of the same state or a completely different state how he is appalled
by the use of the famous mark on such distasteful products. The
resulting effect is similar to that in infringement because there is
potential for consumers who have not been exposed to the junior mark to
become offended and attribute the tarnishing use to the famous mark.28 7
By comparison, there is little chance that a consumer would tell that
same friend that the junior user's mark in his hometown is driving down
the distinctiveness of the famous mark. Thus the blurring, if any, is
limited to that small area of the country.
Based on the foregoing, it should have been no surprise to the court
in Nabisco when it noted that the Second Circuit has sometimes declined
to apply the "Mead Data factors," some of which were incorporated in
the Nabisco factors, by citing to Deere, a tarnishment case.2 88 With
tarnishment, the two most relevant factors are those adopted by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Eli Lilly v.
Natural Answers, Inc.,289 those being "renown of the famous mark" and
the "similarity of the marks. 29 ° While direct evidence of tarnishing,
such as consumer surveys, might be necessary to demonstrate that
consumers are in fact attributing the use of the junior user's mark to the
owner of the famous mark,291 these two factors are the most significant,
285. See, e.g., NBA Props. v. Untertainment Records, LLC, 99 C1V. 2933 (HB), 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7780, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 1999).
286. See discussion supra Part V.B.4.
287. In a hypothetical trademark infringement scenario, a consumer will purchase a product
from a manufacturer bearing a mark that is confusingly similar to that of the mark used by a
manufacturer the consumer has purchased the same product from in the past. This time though the
consumer is not satisfied because of the shoddy quality of the junior user's product. Believing this
product originated from the first manufacturer, the consumer may express his unhappiness to other
potential consumers. This information may prevent those other consumers from purchasing products
bearing the senior mark though they themselves have not been confused or ever received shoddy
quality products from that manufacturer. See discussion supra Part ll.B.
288. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 227 (2d Cir. 1999), overruled inpart
by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 123 S.Ct. 1115 (2003).
289. 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000).
290. See id.
at 469.
291. See Larry C. Jones & Jason M. Sneed, "Moseley" IsFirst Take on Dilution, NAT'L L.J.,
Apr. 28, 2003, at C1 (noting that a survey measuring the impact of the accused mark on the
consumer's perception of the famous mark or the products associated with that mark could be useful
in proving actual dilution or the absence thereof). With tarnishment, a consumer survey can be
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given the nature of the harm. Therefore, as long as the senior mark is
famous, so that consumers know of it, and the marks are similar enough,
so that consumers will be able to link them together, and consumers are
attributing the use to the owner of the famous mark, there is sufficient
proof of "actual harm" for a court to find the existence of tarnishing.
These factors take into consideration that there is already some intent
incorporated in tarnishing uses of a famous mark, since most tarnishing
uses do not originate by chance.292 It is this intentional reminding that
further necessitates the lower level of proof of actual harm since the
tarnishment injury is impossible to undo if not enjoined from the very
beginning.2 93
2. The Higher Level of Proof of Actual Harm for Blurring
The harm caused by blurring differs so greatly from both
infringement and tarnishment that it should require a higher level proof
of some actual harm, lest we offer property-rights-in-gross to
trademarks. To differentiate the level of actual harm proposed for
blurring from the level of actual harm applicable for tarnishing claims,
the owner of a famous mark will have to rely on more evidentiary proof
than simply the "renown of the famous mark." and the "similarity of the
marks." The level of proof of the actual-harm standard proposed herein
would require an owner of famous mark to establish blurring through
circumstantial evidence that will justify a court's inference of harm.
Though this method was rejected by the Fourth Circuit, and even before
the Supreme Court stated that this form of evidence would be
acceptable, the Second Circuit appropriately acknowledged that in
almost every area of law facts may be found by drawing logical
inferences from other established facts 2 94 and observed that there was no
reason why this should not be applicable to dilution claims.295 Therefore,
since not every case of blurring is the same, different factors are relevant
under the circumstances.

especially useful in demonstrating "any diminution of the favorable imagery and attributes
associated with the brand" if the survey "inquir[es] as to how consumers feel about the brand or
products associated with the senior mark before and after consumers' exposure to the accused mark,
and why consumers feel that way." ld;see also infra text accompanying note 296 (explaining how
consumer surveys could be most beneficial if owners of famous trademarks begin to construct them
before the tarnishing uses come into existence).
292. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
293.

See Respondents Brief at 30-31, V Secret Catalogue(No. 01-1015).

294. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224 n.5 (2d Cir. 1999), overruled in
part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 123 S.Ct. 1115 (2003).

295. See id. at 224.
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As with tarnishment, the question remains: What factors should a
court examine when adjudicating a blurring claim? In addition to
carefully constructed consumer surveys,2 96 the first factor a court should
look to is the "similarity of the marks," i.e., whether the junior user is
using a mark that is identical to the famous mark as opposed to one that
is merely substantially similar. When courts and commentators have
offered examples of blurring, they have predominantly used examples of
products bearing marks that are identical to famous marks.297 The use of
a mark that is identical to a famous mark has greater potential to blur a
famous mark than where the consumers have to make a connection
between the marks as they would in "VICTORIA'S SECRET" and
"VICTOR'S LITTLE SECRET." The Supreme Court, in V Secret
Catalogue, implied that the burden would be lower if the two marks in
question were identical, 298 and therefore courts presented with such a
scenario should weight this factor more heavily than the others. The
foregoing is not meant to discount the effect of the use of a substantially
similar mark, since it "nevertheless may harm the [trademark owner] by
lessening the distinctiveness and thus the commercial value of the
[senior] mark[].,, 299 Along the same lines, the level of distinctiveness of
the famous mark should be a factor considered. That is, where the
famous mark is one that has "'added to rather than withdrawn from the
human vocabulary,"' it should be afforded greater protection since the
owner of the famous trademark, by contributing to the human
vocabulary, is not claiming for itself a word or phase that once belonged
300
to no one.
296. Though the following advice could easily pertain to owners of famous trademarks who
wish to use consumer surveys in demonstrating actual harm in their tamishment cases, it is
especially important in cases of blurring. An owner of a famous mark could begin to prepare its case
before any blurring uses come into existence. This can be achieved by instructing their marketing
departments to prepare "predilution" evidence of brand imagery and attributes, as perceived by the
relevant consumer markets. See Jones and Sneed, supra note 291. Therefore, when a potential cause
of action for blurring does arise, the "predilution" evidence can be supplemented with "post-dilution
measurements [that] may be used to determine whether there has been any actual impact on the
perceptions associated with those brands as a result of the allegedly dilutive conduct." Id.
297. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski,
J.) (using as examples of blurring "TYLENOL" snowboards, "NETSCAPE" sex shops and
"HARRY POTTER" dry cleaners), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 993 (2003); GILSON, supra note 79, §
5.12[l][c][i], at 5-233 (using as examples of blurring "PEPSI" in-line skates, "MICROSOFT"
lipstick, "KLEENEX" machine guns, and "JOCKEY" automobile tires).
298. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1124 (2003).
299. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 539 (1987).
300. V Secret Catalogue,537 U.S. 418, 123 S. Ct. at 1122 (quoting Schechter, supra note 18,
at 829). The Court noted that Schechter's theory of dilution was based on the use of a well-known
trademark, classified as arbitrary, on a non-competing product that would not have constituted
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The next factor a court should look to is the "similarity of [the]
products" because "[b]lurring occurs in the minds of potential
customers., 30 1 While the Seventh Circuit concluded that the "similarity
of the products" factor is "completely irrelevant" under the FTDA
because the statute states that dilution can occur "'regardless of the
presence or absence ... of competition between the [parties],' 30 2 the
court is only correct to the extent that this factor has no relevance and
should not be discussed in a scenario involving completely different
products. It also follows that this factor could be relevant where the
products are similar. 3 This factor was adopted by the Second Circuit
because the facts with which it was presented made it relevant.30 4 It is

relevant because there is a greater risk that the distinctive quality of the
famous mark will be lessened in the minds of consumers that have the
capability of viewing products bearing the senior mark and junior mark
simultaneously. Therefore, the use of a junior mark on a dissimilar
product in a very limited
market is a fact that should weigh against a
30 5
finding of blurring.
In addition to the "similarity of the marks," "the size of the market"
in which the junior user's mark is used is another relevant factor. If
consumers are not able to observe both marks, there is no occasion for
30 6
the distinctiveness of the famous mark to be lessened in their minds.
Given a fact situation similar to Nabisco, a court should weigh this
factor in favor of finding blurring, because both products are going to be
trademark infringement, thus the reason why Schechter believed dilution should be a recognizable
cause of action. See id. The Second Circuit has held that only those marks that are inherently
distinctive (i.e., marks that are classified as fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive) are capable of
protection under the FTDA in the first place, thus removing all famous descriptive marks that have
acquired federal trademark registration only upon a showing of secondary meaning. See TCPIP
Holding Co. v. Haar Communications, 244 F.3d 88, 96 (2d Cir. 2001). Not all United States courts
of appeals have agreed, and have not distinguished between marks that have acquired
distinctiveness (i.e., secondary meaning) and those that are inherently distinctive. See AM Gen.
Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 812 (7th Cir. 2002); Avery Dennison Corp. v.
Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 876-877 (9th Cir. 1999).
301. I.P. Lund Trading ApS Kroin Inc. v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 49-50 (1st Cir. 1998).
302. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 1127 (1994) (alteration in original).
303. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 222 (2d Cir. 1999), overruled in part
by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003).
304. See id. at 217.
305. Compare Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 220 (noting that both products are nationally marketed and
target at the same audience), with Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah
Div. of Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605, 619-20 (E.D. Va. 1997) (noting that the junior user's mark is
confined to a small limited market of sophisticated consumers), aff'd, 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999),
overruled in part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003).
306. See L.P. Lund, 163 F.3d at 49-50.
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nationally advertised, thus increasing the chances that the entire
population will be able to see both marks simultaneously. Conversely, as
in V Secret Catalogue, where the facts present a nationally advertised
famous mark and a junior mark in a very limited market, where there is
little exposure outside that area, a court should weigh this factor against
a finding of blurring.
The "sophistication level of the relevant consumers" is also
important because even if consumers are positioned to view both marks
simultaneously, they may have the ability to continue to distinguish the
two marks in their minds, thus allowing the mark to keep its distinctive
quality. 30 7 Another relevant factor for a court to look at when searching
for the necessary level of proof of actual harm could be the "current
position of the junior user." Where the facts present a junior user that has
not entered the market yet, as in Nabisco, the court should look closer at
other factors to determine whether there is a potential for actual harm to
the existing famous mark. On the other hand, when a fact situation
involves marks that have co-existed for any length of time, as in
Ringling and Westchester Media, this factor might logically lead a court
to decide that the potential for actual harm is nonexistent.
The "intent of the junior user" is a factor that has received both
acceptance and rejection from the circuit courts.30 8 As previously stated,
with tarnishment there is already an implied predatory intent
incorporated into the junior user's selection of its mark. 30 9 This factor, as
it pertains to blurring, should be viewed as just another relevant factor
incorporated into the court's analysis of circumstantial evidence
presented.310 The intent of the junior user becomes especially apparent
when viewed in conjunction with the "similarity of the products"
factor,3 1 specifically because the junior's intent could be evidenced

307. See id. at 50.
308. Compare Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 225 (disagreeing with district court's finding of predatory
intent, but impliedly acknowledging that this factor may be relevant if the junior user adopted its
mark "in the hope of benefiting from association with [the] famous [mark]."), with Eli Lilly & Co.
v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 469 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[llntent of the junior mark holder...
[is] not particularly relevant to the 'capacity of [the senior] mark to identify and distinguish' itself.")
(footnote and additional internal quotation marks omitted) (third alteration in original).
309. See discussion supra Part V.C.I.
310. The use of this factor has also been rejected because the FTDA allows for damages upon
the finding of "willful intent," and so the argument is that this factor should only be considered in
respect to available remedies, not a finding of blurring. See Clinique Labs., Inc. v. Dep Corp., 945
F. Supp. 547, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
311. See Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 626 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[T]he
absence of predatory intent by the junior user is a relevant factor in assessing a [dilution] claim ...
since relief under the statute is of equitable origin.") (citation omitted). Though the court was
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through an aggressive advertising campaign to accentuate its mark.312
Put another way, when the junior user is operating in the same market as
the senior user there is already a substantial risk that there will be a
lessening in the capacity of the famous mark to identify the senior user's
goods because consumers are capable of viewing both marks
simultaneously. 313 That risk can exponentially increase when the junior
user deliberately chooses its mark to trade on the fame of the senior
mark and makes this intent obvious. Finally, the rejection of this factor
by some courts is admittedly more appropriate where the marks are
being used in completely different markets because of the inability of
consumers to view both marks, but the willful intent on the part of the
junior user will not go unnoticed, assuming blurring is found, given the
court will have the discretion to award damages.31 4
The factors discussed here are for illustrative purposes and do not
exhaust those range of factors that are potentially relevant, including
those already elaborated on in the various circuit court decisions. The
FTDA applies the moment the unauthorized use of a famous mark
reduces the public's perception that the mark signifies something unique,
singular, or particular, but by requiring this level of proof of actual harm
in cases of blurring, courts and commentators will be assured that
trademark owners will not be receiving the windfall of the relief
provided by the FTDA when they have not actually been harmed.31 5
VI.

CONCLUSION

The number of trademarks that are eligible for protection from
blurring and tarnishing junior users is small in comparison to the number
of trademarks in use. 316 In addition, the long-standing acknowledgement
of the existence of both forms of dilution and the purpose of the FTDA
to provide national uniformity to the patch-quilt system of protection
afforded by the states must be considered when interpreting the FTDA.
The two levels of proof of actual harm proposed by this Note are
discussing New York's anti-dilution statute, this statement should be equally applicable to the
FTDA. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 225 (disagreeing with the district court's finding of predatory
intent under the facts, but nonetheless implying that this could be a relevant factor because of the
junior user's hope of benefiting from association with the famous mark).
312. See Clinique Labs., 945 F. Supp. at 563.
313. See discussion supra Part V.B.4
314. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (Supp. V 2000)
315. See Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 192 F. Supp. 2d 790, 804 (W.D. Tenn. 2001).
316. See GILSON, supra note 79, § 5.12, at 5-227 (2001) (noting that though the FTDA protects
famous marks, "it leaves the more numerous journeyman trademarks that dot the landscape to the
more traditional infringement remedies, at least until they become 'famous.'").
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formulated with the above in mind and reflect the principle that
"[d]iminishment of the famous mark's capacity can be shown by the
probable consequences flowing from use or adoption of the [junior
user's] mark. 317 Moreover, both levels of proof adhere to the
"principles of equity" and recognize the "well-established presumption
that injuries arising from Lanham Act violations are irreparable, even
absent a showing of business lOSS. ' '318 Accordingly, absent a
Congressional decision to overhaul the FTDA to include only the
traditional blurring claim or in the alternative specifically requiring the
same level of proof for both claims, the dichotomous standard approach
proposed by this Note is a logical extension of the decision making
process courts have employed from the beginning.
Joseph J. Galvano*

317. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1126 (2003)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
318. Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 16 (7th Cir. 1992).
* This Note is dedicated to my parents, Anthony and Rosalie, for their unconditional love,
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writer. I would also like to thank Professor Leon Friedman for his suggestions and for sharing his
perspective on many of the issues presented in this Note. In addition, I extend my deepest gratitude
to my legal writing instructor, Professor Amy R. Stein, for her dedication early on, truly setting me
on the path to becoming a better legal writer well before this Note was conceived. Finally, I extend
my warmest thanks to the entire membership of the Hofstra Law Review for all of their hard work
and dedication in editing my Note.
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